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We analyze the effects of local market size and accessibility on the spatial distribution of economic activity and
wages in general equilibrium trade models with many asymmetric countries and costly trade for all goods. In
models with a homogeneous sector, local market size is generally more strongly correlated with a country's in-
dustry share, whereas accessibility better explains a country's wage. We analytically show that result in a
simplified case and then confirm it using simulations with random trading networks. In models with only
differentiated sectors, both local market size and accessibility are highly correlated with wages. The impact of
local market size on industry location is more robust than the impact of local market size on wages in economic
geography models.1. Introduction
Do market size and accessibility matter for industry location and
wages? This question has attracted attention since Krugman's (1980) and
Helpman and Krugman's (1985) seminal contributions to new trade
theory. The answer is ‘yes’, at least in simple models: in a world with
increasing returns and costly trade, market size and accessibility are
locational advantages that influence the geographic distribution of in-
dustry and factor prices.1 Despite its importance, it is fair to say that this
result has been derived under a number of restrictive assumptions: (i) the
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Taken together, those assumptions imply that little is known about the
robustness of the result and on how it can eventually guide empirical
analysis.
Conscious of these limitations, subsequent work has relaxed some of
the initial assumptions on preferences, costless trade, and two locations.
First, Ottaviano and Thisse (2004), Picard and Zeng (2005), Zeng and
Kikuchi (2009), Baldwin et al. (2003), and Head et al. (2002), among
others, have shown that the basic insights of ‘home market effects’
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oligopolistic competition. Yu (2005) generalizes Davis (1998) by
changing the upper-tier utility function from a Cobb-Douglas to the more
general CES formulation. He shows that—when expenditure shares are
non-constant—a HME or a reversed HME can arise depending on the
elasticity of substitution between sectors. Second, Davis (1998) and
Takatsuka and Zeng (2012a) have shown that the effect of market size on
industry location is strongly dampened or even disappears when the
homogeneous good is not costlessly tradable. Davis (1998), in particular,
shows that when trading the homogeneous good is as costly as trading
the differentiated good, market size has no longer any bearing on country
specialization. This is also one basic message of Hanson and Xiang
(2004), who argue that—in the absence of a costlessly tradable good-
—not all increasing returns sectors can display a HME.2
While all of the foregoing contributions shed some light on the role of
market size and accessibility for industry location and wages, what is
missing to date is more systematic evidence for what happens in more
‘realistic settings’ where several of the basic assumptions are relaxed
simultaneously. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no sys-
tematic investigation when there are multiple locations, several in-
dustries, and costly trade for all goods. This paper addresses precisely
these issues.
As a first step, we set up two trade models with two sectors, costly
trade, and an arbitrary number of countries. We first develop a model
with one homogeneous sector and one differentiated sector, both subject
to trade costs. This is sufficient to generate very different equilibrium
relationships between local market size and wages: depending on the
countries' specialization patterns (complete specialization, incomplete
specialization, and complete diversification), wages can decrease, be
independent of, or increase with local market size. To shed additional
light on our analytical results, and to better isolate the effect of accessi-
bility, we solve the model for a limited number of countries and alter-
native configurations that systematically change network centrality and
market size between the extreme ring and star network topologies. Doing
so, we confirm the result that changes in market size matter more for
changes in industry location, whereas changes in accessibility matter
more for changes in wages.
We then develop a model with two differentiated industries subject to
increasing returns and costly trade. In that model, local market size and
accessibility are associated with higher wages, whereas differences in
spending patterns are associated with industry location. In the general
case, a mix of the two prevails and the relative effect of market size on the
two equilibrium variables—industry location and wages—though posi-
tive, depends on the whole structure of the trading network.
As there is little hope to obtain clear-cut analytical results in the
general case with an arbitrary number of countries and geographic
structures of the trading network, as a second step we resort to systematic
numerical simulations. More precisely, we simulate the equilibria of the2 Takatsuka and Zeng (2012b) propose another model with capital mobility,
trade cost, and two countries. They find that the HME always appears for
transport costs in both the homogeneous and differentiated sector. Turning to
multi-country extensions of those models, Behrens et al. (2007, 2009) derive
results when there are more than two countries. They show that the topology of
the trading network matters for several of the results, and that the impact of
market size on industry location arises only when differences in factor costs and
in accessibility to markets are controlled for. While empirically relevant,
multi-location extensions of new trade models to arbitrary geographic structures
have been quite rare in the literature until now (see, e.g., Bosker et al., 2010;
Stelder, 2016). Finally, Takahashi et al. (2013) derive analytical results in the
case without factor price equalization with two countries, while Zeng and
Kikuchi (2009) and Zeng and Uchikawa (2014) provide results without factor
price equalization for many countries. Behrens et al. (2009) use a ‘hybrid’
approach, where trading the homogeneous good is costless, but where exoge-
nous Ricardian differences in labor productivity in the homogeneous sector
across countries create exogenous wage differences.
2two models using a large number of randomly generated networks with a
large number of countries. We then check how our pencil-and-paper
results—and simulations for basic configurations—extend to these
higher-dimensional cases and extract the essence of the ‘comparative
statics’ using statistical analysis. Put differently, our research strategy is
to combine theory, numerical, and statistical analysis to: (i) first prove
some new results in simple models; (ii) then solve larger models by nu-
merical analysis; (iii) then run a statistical analysis of the numerical re-
sults, very much like engineers or physicists do; and (iv) finally confront
the models with real data in an application to European Union countries.
Our key findings can be summarized as follows. First, in accord with
the theoretical results derived in lower-dimensional instances of the
models and simulations on simple networks, the effect of local market
size on equilibrium wages crucially hinges on the countries' specializa-
tion patterns in our numerical simulations. Second, in all models that we
simulate, the equilibrium relationship between local market size and
industry location is more robust than the relationship between local
market size and wages. Although the results vary slightly depending on
the type of trading network considered, they are fairly robust. Third, the
correlation between equilibrium wages and equilibrium industry shares
is rather low, thus suggesting that both variables operate largely inde-
pendently. Last, when applied to European Union country-level data, we
find that in both cases the models generally predict well the distribution
of industries, yet predict less well wages. A formal test does not allow to
reject the null hypothesis that the industry distribution predicted by the
models is the same than that observed in the data. The test does, how-
ever, reject the predicted wage distributions, because the stylized models
cannot replicate the observed dispersion in wages across countries. This
again shows that the models do a good job at predicting industry loca-
tion, but are less useful for predicting wages.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 de-
velops our two simple trade models. We derive a number of comparative
static results using specific instances of those models and illustrate
several key economic properties and specialization patterns for simple
network configurations. These results serve to guide the numerical
analysis in Section 3. There, we extend the models to a larger scale and
analyze a set of numerical results obtained from simulating those two
models for a large number of random networks, generated by using two
alternative attachment algorithms for network growth. We then present,
in Section 4, an application to the case of European Union country data.
Finally, Section 5 concludes. Most technical details are relegated to a set
of appendices.
2. Two models with costly trade
We develop two models within which we analyze the geographic
distribution of economic activity and wages.3 In both models, there are
M 2 countries subscripted by i¼ 1, 2,…, M. Each country is endowed
with Li immobile workers-consumers. The total population in the econ-
omy is fixed at LPiLi. Labor is the only production factor, i.e., we
abstract from comparative advantages across countries.2.1. Model 1: one differentiated sector and one homogeneous sector
Our first model builds on Helpman and Krugman (1985) and its
multi-location extensions by Behrens et al. (2007, 2009). There is one
increasing returns to scale (IRS) sector that operates under monopolistic
competition and produces a continuum of varieties of a horizontally
differentiated good; and one constant returns to scale (CRS) sector that3 The two models are not nested. We could develop a three sector model that
nests our two models, but there is little gain from doing so. Indeed, as we will
see later, it is the presence or absence of the homogeneous sector that is
important for the key results of the model, not the presence of several differ-
entiated sectors.
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As is standard in the literature, the sectors producing the differentiated
and homogeneous goods are also referred to as industrial (or modern)
and agricultural (or traditional), respectively. In the differentiated sector,
the combination of IRS, costless product differentiation, and the absence
of scope economies yields a one-to-one equilibrium relationship between
firms and varieties.
2.1.1. Preferences and demands
Preferences of a representative consumer in country j are given by:
Uj ¼ H1μj Dμj ; (1)
where Hj stands for the consumption of the homogeneous good; where Dj
is an aggregate of the varieties of the differentiated good; and where
0< μ< 1 is the share of income spent on the differentiated good. We
assume that Dj is given by a CES subutility function
Dj ¼
"X
i
Z
Ωi
dijðωÞðσ1Þ=σdω
# σ
σ1
;
where dij(ω) is the individual consumption in country j of variety ω
produced in country i; and where Ωi is the set of varieties produced in i.
The parameter σ > 1 measures the elasticity of substitution between any
two varieties. Let pHj denote the price of the homogeneous good in
country j and pij(ω) the price of variety ω produced in country i and
consumed in country j. Let wj denote the wage in country j. Maximizing
(1) subject to the budget constraint pHj Hj þ
P
i
R
Ωi pijðωÞdijðωÞdω ¼ wj
yields the following individual demands:
dijðωÞ ¼ pijðωÞ
σ
P1σj
μwj and Hj ¼ ð1 μÞwjpHj
; (2)
where Pj is the CES price index in country j, given by
Pj ¼
"X
i
Z
Ωi
pijðωÞ1σdω
# 1
1σ
: (3)
2.1.2. Differentiated good
We first explain the workings of the sector operating under increasing
returns to scale. The technology is assumed to be identical across firms
and countries, therefore implying that firms differ only by the variety
they produce and the country they are located in. Since varieties enter
preferences in a symmetric way, we henceforth suppress the variety
index ω to alleviate notation. Production of any variety involves a fixed
labor requirement, F, and a constant marginal labor requirement, c.
Denote by xij the amount of a variety produced in i and shipped to j. The
total labor requirement for producing output xi
P
jxij is given by
li¼ F þ cxi.
Trade in the differentiated good is costly. Following standard practice
we assume that trade cost are of the iceberg form: τij 1 units must be
dispatched from country i in order for one unit to arrive in country j. We
further assume that trade costs are symmetric, i.e., τij¼ τji.4 Using the
demands (2), each firm in i maximizes its profit
πi ¼
X
j

pij  cwiτij

Lj
pσij
P1σj
μwj  Fwi (4)
with respect to the prices pij, taking the price indices Pj and the wages wj
as given. Because of CES preferences, profit-maximizing prices display
constant markups and are given by4 This assumption is not crucial but relatively standard. We relax it later in
Section 4 when applying our model to European Union countries.
3pij ¼ σσ  1 cwiτij: (5)In what follows, we denote by ni the endogenously determined mass of
firms located in country i, and by NPini the total mass of firms in the
economy. We also denote by λi ni/N the share of firms located in
country i.
Because of iceberg trade costs, a firm in country i has to produce
xij Ljdijτij units to satisfy aggregate demand in country j. Free entry and
exit imply that profits are non-positive in equilibrium which, using (4)
and the pricing rule (5), yields the condition
xi 
X
j
Ljdijτij  Fðσ  1Þc : (6)
When (6) holds with equality, the firm located in country i makes zero
profits, whereas it makes losses should the inequality be strict. Note that
we may have strict inequalities since countries can specialize in the
traditional sector and have no industrial activity.
Let ϕij  τ1σij 2 ½0; 1 denote the ‘freeness of trade’ in the differenti-
ated good between countries i and j. Inserting the demand (2) and the
price index (3) into (6), multiplying both sides by pij, and using the prices
(5), we get:
X
j
wσi wjϕijLjP
k
w1σk ϕkjnk
 σF
μ
: (7)
Dividing both sides by the total population, L, letting θj Lj/L, and
choosing—without loss of generality—units for F such that F μL/σ, we
can rewrite (7) as follows5:
RMPi 
X
j
wσi wjϕijθjP
k
w1σk ϕkjnk
 1; (8)
where RMPi stands for the real market potential of country i (Head and
Mayer, 2004). The mass of workers employed in the differentiated in-
dustry of country i, when it has ni firms, is
LDi  nili ¼ niðF þ cxiÞ ¼ niμL; (9)
where we have made use of our normalization of F.
Equation (8) is crucial for determining the equilibrium allocation of
firms across countries. Roughly speaking, this condition subsumes how
many firms ni can be located in each country i while making zero profits
conditional on the different wages wi, market sizes θi, and trade costs ϕij
across countries. If RMPi< 1, firms cannot make positive profits in
country i and ni¼ 0 must hold. If ni> 0, i.e., there are firms operating in
country i, then RMPi¼ 1 must hold because of the free entry zero profit
condition.
2.1.3. Homogeneous good
We next explain the workings of the perfectly competitive sector that
operates under constant returns to scale. We again assume that tech-
nology is the same in all countries. Without loss of generality, we
normalize the unit labor requirement to one. Perfect competition implies
marginal cost pricing. Given LDi workers employed in the differentiated
good industry, the number of workers employed in the homogeneous
sector equals LHi  Li  LDi . Plugging (9) into that expression, we can
rewrite the number of workers in the homogeneous sector as
LHi ¼ Li  niμL: (10)5 This normalization is innocuous since we do not conduct any comparative
static exercises with respect to those variables in what follows.
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specialize in the production of the differentiated good only.
We assume that trading the homogeneous good is costly.6 Hence,
factor price equalization (FPE) need not hold and the world mass of firms
in the differentiated industry need no longer be constant.7 The price of
the homogeneous good produced in i and delivered to j equals its mar-
ginal cost of production, the wage wi, times the trade cost τHij between
countries i and j: pHij ¼ wiτHij  wiξτij, where ξ> 0 is a parameter that
captures the relative cost of trading the homogeneous good compared to the
differentiated good. If ξ¼ 1, there are no cost differences. When ξ> 1,
trading the homogeneous good is more costly than trading the differen-
tiated good, and vice versa when ξ< 1. In what follows, we set ξ< 1
because in the opposite case there is no trade in the homogeneous good
so that the only equilibrium is one where industry shares are proportional
to the size of the local market (see Davis, 1998).8
Because good H is homogeneous and can be produced in, and im-
ported from, any country, its price in country i equals the lowest one that
can be secured from any source:
pHi ¼ mink fwkξτkig (11)
Let Xji denote the imports of the homogeneous good from country j.
Demand for the homogeneous good is given by (2), while supply is
determined by the domestic production for the local market, Xii, and the
sum of imports Xji from all sources. Market clearing for the homogeneous
good in country i hence requires that:
ð1 μÞwiLi
pHi
¼ Xii þ
X
j 6¼i
Xji: (12)
Dividing the foregoing expression by the total population, L, and using
the price (11), we can write (12) in terms of population shares, pro-
duction, and per capita imports:
ð1 μÞwiθi
minkfwkξτkig ¼
eXii þX
j 6¼i
eXji; (13)
where eXii  Xii=L, and eXji  Xji=L denote per capita variables. Labor
market clearing in country i then requires that LHi ¼ Li  niμL ¼
ξ

τiiXii þ
P
j 6¼iτijXij

. Since Li¼ θiL, we can rewrite the foregoing condi-
tion in per capita terms as follows:
θi  niμ ¼ ξ
 
τiieXii þX
j 6¼i
τijeXij
!
(14)
Because of perfect competition, the homogeneous good will not be
simultaneously imported and exported by the same country. Hence, it
must be that6 See Appendix A.1 for a discussion of the case with costless trade of the
homogeneous good. There we also explain why we disregard that case in what
follows.
7 The total mass of firms, N, varies with the spatial structure of the economy
when there is costly trade in the homogeneous good (see, e.g., Takatsuka and
Zeng, 2012a, b). Hence, (8) cannot be generally expressed in the usual share
notation λi with respect to firms, which explains the presence of nk in that
expression.
8 There is, of course, still two-way trade in the differentiated good and the
wages adjust to balance that trade. However, our focus is on industry structure
and wages. The former cannot be meaningfully analyzed when we assume that
ξ 1, whereas the latter cannot be meaningfully analyzed if we assume that
there is free trade in the homogeneous good (see Appendix A.1).
4Xe ij ¼ > 0 if wiτij  minkwkτkj;¼ 0 otherwise:

This latter condition can be expressed equivalently using complementary
slackness as follows:
eXij 	wiτij min
k

wkτkj

 ¼ 0 and eXij  0; 8j ¼ 1; 2;…;M: (15)
2.1.4. Equilibrium
An equilibrium is such that the real market potential (8) is equal to
one in all countries with a positivemass of IRS firms, and less than one for
countries devoid of such firms. If all countries have a positive mass of IRS
firms, we have an interior equilibrium, whereas if there are some countries
without differentiated firms we get a corner equilibrium. Following Beh-
rens et al. (2007, 2009), and as previously explained, an equilibrium is
formally given by:
RMPi ¼ 1 if n*i > 0:
RMPi  1 if n*i ¼ 0:
(16)
Using complementary slackness notation, this implies that ni ðRMPi  1Þ
¼ 0 and ni  0 for all countries. In addition to the zero profit free entry
condition (16), the market clearing conditions (14) for the homogeneous
good must hold for all countries at the equilibrium wages wi. Expressions
(13), (14), and (16), with M conditions each, and (15), with M(M  1)
conditions, yield a system of 3 M þ M(M 1) equations in that many
unknowns—the M firm masses ni, the M wages wi, the M per capita do-
mestic supplies eXii, and the M(M 1) per capita imports eXij.
2.2. Model 2: two differentiated sectors
Our second model builds on Krugman (1980) and Behrens and
Ottaviano (2011). There are two IRS sectors with CES monopolistic
competition.9 Countries' market sizes differ both because of the numbers
of consumers and because consumers have different spending patterns
for the two goods. In such a setting, we can look at how differences in
absolute market sizes—the population shares θi—and differences in relative
market sizes—the expenditure shares μi—affect wages and the location
patterns of industries.
2.2.1. Preferences and demands
The basic setup is the same as in Section 2.1, except that there are now
two CES sectors and no homogeneous sector. Preferences of a represen-
tative consumer in country j are given by:
Uj ¼ Dμ1j1j Dμ2j2j ; (17)
where Dsj is the CES consumption aggregate in sector s and country j; and
0< μsj< 1 are the country-specific income shares for sector s. With two
sectors, μsj is equal to μj in sector 1 and to 1 μj in sector 2. Since
expenditure shares are country specific, the relative consumption pat-
terns differ across countries. Hence, market sizes differ due to spending
patterns on top of differences in countries' population sizes.
The aggregator for consumption of the differentiated good, Dsj, is as
follows:
Dsj ¼
"X
i
Z
Ωsi
dsijðωÞðσ1Þ=σdω
# σ
σ1
;9 Hanson and Xiang (2004) develop a model with a continuum of sectors, but
their focus is on two countries only. In this section, we take a complementary
approach: we focus on two sectors only, but consider a large number of coun-
tries to look at industry location and wages with a more complex geography.
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ω produced in country i; and where Ωsi is the set of sector-s varieties
produced in i. For simplicity, we assume that the elasticity of substitution
between any two varieties, σ, is the same in both sectors.10 Let psijðωÞ
denote the price of sector-s varietyω produced in i and consumed in j; and
let wj denote the wage in country j. Maximizing (17) subject to the budget
constraint
P
i
hR
Ω1i p1ijðωÞd1ijðωÞdωþ
R
Ω2i p2ijðωÞd2ijðωÞdω
i
¼ wj yields the
following individual demands:
dsijðωÞ ¼ psijðωÞ
σ
P1σsj
μsjwj; where Psj ¼
"X
i
Z
Ωsi
psijðωÞ1σdω
# 1
1σ
(18)
is the CES price index in sector s and country j.
2.2.2. Technology and trade
For simplicity, we assume that technology and transport costs are the
same in both sectors. As in Section 2.1, the total labor requirement for
producing the output xsi
P
jxsij is given by lsi¼ F þ cxsi. Trade in both
differentiated goods is costly and trade cost are symmetric and of the
iceberg form: τij¼ τji 1 units must be dispatched from country i in order
for one unit of a variety of any sector to arrive in country j. Using (18), a
sector-s firm in i maximizes profit
πsi ¼
X
j

psij  cwiτij

Lj
pσsij
P1σsj
μsjwj  Fwi; (19)
with respect to all its prices psij, taking the price indices Psj and the wages
wj as given. As before, profit-maximizing prices display constant
markups:
psij ¼ σσ  1 cwiτij: (20)
We denote by nsi the endogenously determined mass of sector-s firms
located in i, and by Ns
P
insi the total mass of sector-s firms in the
economy. Last, λsi nsi/Ns denotes the share of sector-s firms in country i.
A firm in country i and sector s has to produce xsij Ljdsijτij units to
satisfy aggregate demand in country j. Free entry and exit imply that
profits are non-positive in equilibrium which, using the prices (20),
yields again the standard free entry zero profit condition (6). Inserting
the demands and the price index (18) into that expression, using the
prices (20), and letting ϕij  τ1σij 2 ½0;1 denote the ‘freeness of trade’
between countries i and j, we get:
X
j
wσi wjϕijLjμsjP
k
w1σk ϕkjnsk
 σF: (21)
Dividing both sides by world population, L, letting θj Lj/L as before, and
choosing without loss of generality units of F such that F¼ L/σ, we obtain
the real market potential for sector-s firms in country i as follows:
RMPsi 
X
j
wσi wjϕijθjμsjP
k
w1σk ϕkjnsk
 1: (22)
As before, condition (22) subsumes how many firms nsi in sector s can be
located in each country i while making zero profits conditional on the
different wages wi, market sizes θi, spending patterns μsi, and the freeness
of trade ϕij across countries.10 We could relax that assumption, but there is not much to be learned from
that exercise. The same holds true for relaxing the assumption of identical
technologies in the two sectors. Nevertheless, as explained in footnote 26 below,
we have also studied the effects of alternative values of σ and expenditure
patterns μsj on industry shares, λsi, and wages, wi.
52.2.3. Equilibrium
Expressions (22) define 2M conditions in the 3M unknowns {n1i, n2i,
wi}, for i¼ 1, 2,…, M. To pin down the wages, we can impose either the
labor market clearing conditions or the trade balance conditions. In what
follows, we use the former as they are easier to handle given our choices
of normalization. Labor market clearing in i requires that
Li¼ n1i(F þ cx1i) þ n2i(F þ cx2i)¼ L(n1i þ n2i), where we have used the
normalization of F. Hence,
θi ¼ n1i þ n2i: (23)
Conditions (22) and (23) can be solved for the equilibrium wages and
industry shares. The total masses of firms in the two sectors in the
economy, N1¼
P
in1i and N2¼
P
in2i are not constant and vary with the
spatial distribution of demand and with the structure of the trading
network. Note, of course, that the total mass of firms in both sectors in the
world economy is equal to one:
P
i(n1i þ n2i)¼
P
iθi¼ 1 from (23).2.3. Analytical results for simple networks
Although our primary objective is to simulate the two models using
more complex spatial structures involvingmany countries, we first derive
a number of results using simplified versions of those models. Doing so
will provide guidance for the interpretation of the numerical results that
we derive later. We proceed in two steps. First, we establish several
analytical results on the relationship between market size, wages, and
industry location using two or three countries only. This setup facilitates
the exposition and the algebra while allowing us to understand a number
of key properties. Second, we present some numerical simulations using
simple networks that we vary smoothly between two extreme configu-
rations, namely the ring (circle) and star networks. Doing so allows us to
control the network structure to distill insights into the importance of
accessibility and provides intuition about the impact of the shape of trade
networks on economic geography.
2.3.1. Analytical results
Model 1: The importance of the homogeneous good.We first show
that the comparative statics of industry shares and wages with respect to
the size of the local market depend on the specialization and trade pat-
terns. Let us start with three countries. For simplicity, we assume that
countries 2 and 3 have the same size, θ2¼ θ3 (1 θ)/2, whereas the
size of country 1 is θ1 θ. Consider a pattern involving complete
specialization, i.e., country 1 is the ‘manufacturing core’ for the differ-
entiated good whereas countries 2 and 3 are ‘agricultural peripheries’
specialized in the production of the traditional good. Using share nota-
tion, we thus have n1¼ θ/μ and n2¼ n3¼ 0. Hence, θ parametrizes the
size of the core compared to the size of the (symmetric) peripheries, and
we naturally have ∂n1/∂θ> 0. Let the wage in country 2 be chosen as the
numeraire, i.e., w2 1. As shown in Appendix A.2, the wage in country 1
can then be expressed as follows:
w1 ¼ μ1 μ
ð1 θÞ
2θ

1þ τ21
τ31

(24)
The foregoing expression reveals two important properties. First, ∂w1/
∂θ< 0, i.e., the wage in country 1 is decreasing with the local market size.
The intuition for this result is a classical terms-of-trade effect: as country
1 becomes larger—and its trading partners become smaller—its relative
wage falls (see equation (13), recalling that eXii ¼ 0 and that μ is fixed).
The reason is that the shift in sizes must reduce demand for the tradi-
tional good in country 1 and increase it in countries 2 and 3. Hence, with
costly trade in the homogeneous good and with complete specialization,
we no longer necessarily have a positive relationship between local
market size and wages. Second, assume that country 2 becomes more
remote from country 1 (i.e., τ21 increases). As can be seen from (A-3) in
the appendix, ∂w1/∂τ21> 0. In other words, more central
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configuration.11
Consider next the case of incomplete specialization with two countries.
In a first regime (type 1), country 1 produces both the differentiated and
the homogeneous good, and country 2 only the homogeneous good. In
that case, it must be that w1¼w2ξτ¼ ξτ> 1 for the traditional good to be
produced in country 1 and simultaneously imported from country 2 to 1,
where τ τ12 denotes the symmetric trade cost between the two coun-
tries. This directly implies that ∂w1/∂θ1¼ 0, i.e., the wage in country 1 is
independent of the size of the local market. The reason is that costly trade
in the homogeneous good imposes strong restrictions on relative wages,
and those restrictions can destroy the positive link between market size
and equilibrium wages. Over the range of incomplete specialization, the
‘law of one price’ breaks the link between local market size and wages. As
shown in Appendix A.3, the equilibrium mass of firms in this equilibrium
with incomplete specialization is given by
n1 ¼ θ þ 1 θ
ξτ
; (25)
which reveals that ∂n1/∂θ> 0. Hence, although wages are independent of
market size, the latter is reflected in industry structure.
A second regime of incomplete specialization (type 2) arises when the
modern sector is active in both countries, n1> 0 and n2> 0, as well as the
traditional sector, LH1 > 0 and L
H
2 > 0; whereas country 1 imports some of
the homogeneous good. In that case, we still have w1¼ ξτ so that ∂w1/
∂θ1¼ 0, i.e., the wage in country 1 is independent of the size of the local
market for the same reason as before. Furthermore, as shown in Appendix
A.3, we again have ∂n1/∂θ> 0.
Finally, there is the case of complete diversification, i.e., when both the
modern and the traditional sectors are active in both countries (n1> 0,
n2> 0, and LH1 > 0, L
H
2 > 0). Under complete diversification, each
country serves its own demand for the traditional good locally:
X21¼ X12¼ 0. This directly implies that X11¼ (1 μ)L1 and X22¼ (1 μ)
L2. Since LD1 ¼ L1 LH1 ¼ μLn1, we have
n1 ¼ L1L ¼ θ and n2 ¼
L2
L
¼ 1 θ; (26)
i.e., industry location is proportional to market size, which implies that
∂n1/∂θ> 0. As there is no trade in the traditional good, this configuration
also requires that 1/w1< ξτ<w1, and the wagew1 adjusts so that firms in
the two countries make zero profits. As shown in Appendix A.4, in an
equilibriumwith complete diversification, there is a positive relationship
between market size and wages: ∂w1/∂θ> 0. The reason is that a larger
local market provides a locational advantage for the increasing returns
sector, and in order to guarantee that this sector operates in both coun-
tries the wage in country 1 must increase to offset the advantage of a
larger local market size. Since there is no trade in the traditional good,
there are no strong constraints on how wages can change.
To summarize, the key message from the foregoing developments is
that there is no clear relationship between wages and local market size in the
model with costly trade in the homogeneous good. Depending on the trade
and specialization patterns, this relationship can be positive (complete
diversification), zero (incomplete specialization), or even negative
(complete specialization). As should be clear—and as we will show in the
simulations—with multiple countries we will have different configura-
tions for different sets of countries. Some countries will be completely
diversified, some will be completely specialized, and some will be11 If countries 2 and 3 are located symmetrically with respect to country 1 (i.e.,
τ21¼ τ31), the model reduces to the two-country case. Indeed, it is well known
that in this type of model symmetric configurations with N> 2 countries can be
reduced to two-country cases with different market sizes (see, e.g., Behrens
et al., 2007, 2009). This shows that asymmetric trade cost structures are
fundamental to the investigation of the multi-country models.
6somewhere in between. Hence, we expect that the results on the link
between local market size and wages will be fuzzy. However, we should
see a clearer relationship between local market size and the share of
industry, as shown by the foregoing developments.
Model 2: The importance of absolute and relative size. We next
summarize some analytical results for the model with two differentiated
sectors. To solve the model, we let w1 1 by choice of numeraire.
Focusing on two countries with symmetric trade costs and free intra-
country trade (ϕii¼ 1 and ϕij¼ ϕ for all i 6¼ j), Behrens and Ottaviano
(2011) have investigated two opposite special cases: absolute advantage,
i.e., when the spending patterns of the two countries are the same but
they differ by population size (μ11¼ μ12 and μ21¼ μ22, but θ1> θ2); and
comparative advantage, i.e., when spending patterns are anti-symmetric
but countries have the same population size (μ11¼ μ22 and μ21¼ μ12,
but θ1¼ θ2). General results withN> 2 countries are hard to come by and
they are not required for the subsequent analysis.
Starting with pure ‘comparative advantage’, assume that preferences
are anti-symmetric across countries (μ11¼ μ22 and μ21¼ μ12), and that
both countries are of the same size (θ1¼ θ2). As shown by Behrens and
Ottaviano (2011), the equilibrium is such that
n11 ¼ n22 ¼
μð1þ ϕÞ  ϕ
2ð1 ϕÞ and n

21 ¼ n12 ¼
1 μð1þ ϕÞ
2ð1 ϕÞ ; (27)
and the equilibrium relative wage satisfies w2 ¼ 1. In this case, each
country is the larger market for one of the two goods. Hence, each
country specializes in the production of the good for which it has a
relatively larger local demand. In other words, relative differences in
market sizes lead to different specialization patterns but do not affect
factor prices.
Consider next the polar case of pure ‘absolute advantage’. Assume
that preferences are symmetric across countries (μ11¼ μ12 and μ21¼ μ22),
and that country 1 has the larger market (θ1> θ2). The equilibrium is
then such that
n1i ¼ μθi and n2i ¼ ð1 μÞθi; (28)
for i¼ 1, 2, whereas the equilibrium relative wage satisfies 0 < w2 < 1.
In this case, one country is the larger market for both goods. Hence, the
wage in the larger country must be higher because it offers a locational
advantage for both industries. Clearly, this is akin to absolute advantage
in a Ricardian sense and it is, therefore, capitalized into factor prices.
To summarize, both industry location and wages are positively
related to local market size in the model with two differentiated in-
dustries, but the exact extent depends on the relative importance of ab-
solute and of comparative advantage. The two cases discussed above are
‘pure’ ones to illustrate the key findings, but intermediate cases where
both absolute and comparative advantage play a role should be consid-
ered. Unfortunately, clear results on the impacts of accessibility are not
easy to derive in this model, even with a small number of countries.
Hence, it will be of interest to relax the assumption of just two countries
and of symmetric trade costs to investigate also the interactions with
‘geography’ using numerical methods. This is what we do using simu-
lations in the next sections and European Union data in Section 4.
2.3.2. Numerical results for simple networks
While the foregoing developments allow us to understand the exis-
tence or absence of a link between market size and wages, they provide
less information on the role played by the structure of the trading
network. To understand the latter, we now provide results using
‘controlled’ networks. Following Barbero and Zofío (2016), we solve the
first model for a large number of networks comprised between two
extreme topologies: the ring and the star configurations. The ring to-
pology characterizes a homogeneous space where all countries lie on a
circle—hence the nickname ‘racetrack’ economy—so that no country
enjoys a locational advantage. On the contrary, the star topology—also
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space where the country situated in the center enjoys the most privileged
central position. We generate a large number of intermediate networks
and study how the equilibrium industry shares and wages behave
depending on a measure of network centrality (closeness) and market
size. To keep the dimensionality at a manageable level, we set M¼ 4.12
The freeness of trade matrices corresponding to the ring and the star
networks, with the second country being the center of the star, are the
following:
ϕring ¼
2664
1:00 0:20 0:04 0:20
0:20 1:00 0:20 0:04
0:04 0:20 1:00 0:20
0:20 0:04 0:20 1:00
3775 and
ϕstar ¼
2664
1:00 0:20 0:04 0:04
0:20 1:00 0:20 0:20
0:04 0:20 1:00 0:04
0:04 0:20 0:04 1:00
3775
(29)
On the one hand, at the level of an individual node, the closeness measure
reflects how central a country is in a given network, i.e., it can be
interpreted as a measure of the country's locational advantage. The
closeness centrality of country i is defined as
ci ¼
264
P
j
dij
mink
(P
j
dkj
)
375
1
; (30)
where dij denotes the length of the link—the distance—between coun-
tries i and j. By definition, closeness varies between 0 and 1. On the other
hand, at the level of the network and following Freeman (1978), a
measure of network centrality is computed as the sum of the centrality
differences between the location with the highest centrality and all
remaining locations, divided by the maximum sum of the differences that
can exist in a network with the same number of countries. This measure
of network centrality ranges from 0, when no country has a locational
advantage, to 1, when there is only one country—the central one—with a
locational advantage. It is given by:
CðhÞ ¼
PN
i¼1

chi*  chi

max
	PN
i¼1

chi*  chi
 
 ¼
PN
i¼1

chi*  chi

ðN1ÞðN2Þ
ð2N3Þ
; (31)
where h corresponds to the network being measured and chi* ¼ 1 corre-
sponds to the location(s) with maximum accessibility in the network. In
our controlled networks, the ring topology has a network centrality of 0,
whereas the network centrality is 1 for the star.
We generate 100 configurations with increasing centralities between
the ring and the star. The difference in the freeness of trade matrix be-
tween each network is computed as:
ϕdiff ¼
ϕring  ϕstar
100 1 : (32)
Consequently, the freeness of trade matrix for an intermediate network h
is given by:
ϕh ¼ ϕstar þ ðh 1Þϕdiff ; 8h ¼ 1; 2;…; 100: (33)
For each network h, we solve the first trade model for different popula-
tion shares taking the most central node as reference benchmark—i.e.,
the second node in the star configuration—with θ2 ranging from 0.1 to12 We could use a larger number of countries, but this makes little difference
since the setup if still fairly ‘symmetric’ in our controlled approach.
70.9, and setting θi¼ (1 θ2)/3 for the remaining three countries. Taking
successive increments in the population share of the central region of
0.05, and given the 100 networks generated with different topologies, we
evaluate a total of 1, 600 networks.
The results for the spatial equilibria are shown in Figs. 1 and 2. The
surface plots relate the equilibrium industry shares (λ*2) or wages (w
*
2) of
the differentiated sector in the central node (on the z-axis) to the network
centrality, C(h) (on the y-axis) and to the population shares θ2 (on the x-
axis). For the equilibrium shares, although a nonlinear relation is
observed in Fig. 1, it corresponds to a concave function that displays a
monotonic and positive relationship with both population and node
centrality. As shown, market size θ2 is the most influential variable: for a
given population, increasing the centrality of the central country
marginally increases its share of the differentiated sector, whereas
keeping accessibility constant while increasing its population share leads
to a steep increase in industry shares.
We thus confirm the existence of a positive and strong (even if non-
linear) relationship between market size and equilibrium industry
shares. Moreover, examining the trade and specialization patterns of the
four countries, the outcomes of our simulations for the central region
reveal that type-2 incomplete specialization characterizes the world
economy for θ2> 0, as both the central and peripheral countries produce
both the manufacturing and agricultural goods, with the latter being
traded among them (thereby excluding the case of complete diversifi-
cation). However, when the population share in the most accessible
country 2 increases along with network centrality, the structure of the
world economy evolves to the first type of incomplete specialization.
Indeed, for θ2> 0.65 and C(h)> 0.5, manufacturing tends to agglomerate
in the central country λ2	 1, depleting the peripheral countries of ac-
tivity in that sector. The latter now specialize in the homogeneous good
and export it to the core.
Turning to the equilibrium wages, whose relationship with market
size can take several forms as shown analytically in the foregoing section,
our simulations confirm the two distinct alternatives for incomplete
specialization of type 1 and 2. On the one hand, market size strongly
drives up wages, with w*2 > 1 except for the case where θ2 is small. As
population increases, and regardless of centrality, equilibrium wages w*2
increase and reach the maximum value w*2 	 1:05 for θ2> 0.35, with
∂w*2=∂θ2 ¼ 0, as predicted by the theory. Comparing the gradient of λ*2
and w*2 between Figs. 1 and 2 with respect to market size θ2, we see that
differential accessibility plays a larger role for wages than for industry
location. Hence, market size seems to matter more (and strongly) forFig. 1. Equilibrium shares of the most central region (λ*2) for alternative values
of network centrality (C(h)) and population (θ2).
Fig. 2. Equilibrium wages (w*2) for alternative values of network centrality
(C(h)) and market size (θ2).
14 Choosing ‘totally random’ networks—though providing an interesting
benchmark case—is not fully satisfying because transportation networks are
endogenous and obey certain rules. This is why we also derive results using
networks that display a ‘hub-and-spoke’ structure to capture the empirical fact
that some places are very well connected while others are very poorly connected
J. Barbero et al. Regional Science and Urban Economics 71 (2018) 1–24industry location, whereas accessibility matters more (but less strongly)
for wages.
Although the foregoing results confirm our analytical findings for
basic network topologies and alternative market size distributions in a
systematic way, it remains to be seen whether they will hold for larger
and more complex networks where all trade and economic specialization
regimes can emerge and coexist.13 They provide intuition for—and tell us
what to expect from—the simulations, regression analyses, and numeri-
cal checks that we undertake in the following sections.
3. Size and accessibility in random tree networks
Despite our analytical results and the insights derived from
‘controlled’ networks, it is virtually impossible to derive general
(analytical) results concerning the impact of market size on wages and
industry location in an arbitrary multi-country setting. The reason is that
the impact depends on the equilibrium patterns of trade and specializa-
tion, which are determined by a complex trade-off between a country's
market size and its accessibility in the trading network. Although we
have partially explored the role of accessibility and market size for in-
dustry location and wages in controlled networks with a small number of
countries, in this section we consistently explore it in larger and less
restricted networks that are generated following two alternative algo-
rithms. This allows us to gain further insight into how accessibility and
market size—as well as the whole structure of the trading net-
work—influence the equilibrium.
We proceed as follows. First, we generate large random tree networks
with a random number of nodes (see Appendix B.1 for details). Again, the
nodes are the countries, and the links between nodes represent the
connections for shipping goods. Networks are generated incrementally
either by having equal attachment probabilities for new nodes, or by
using the Barabasi and Albert (1999; henceforth BA) preferential
attachment algorithm that generates networks which exhibit a
‘hub-and-spoke’ structure. Second, we assign a random population share,13 Note that the regime with complete specialization—where some countries
specialize in manufacturing only and some in agriculture only—does not arise in
the controlled networks. Hence, the regime where wages decrease in market size
is absent.
8θi, to each node i of the network.14 In the case with two differentiated
industries, we also randomly assign a country-specific expenditure share
for each industry. Third, we solve the two models for their equilibria (see
Appendix A for the equilibrium conditions). We repeat this three-step
process for a large number of randomly generated networks and then
relate selected characteristics of the equilibria thus obtained to under-
lying networks characteristics. Doing so allows us to gain insights into
how size and accessibility interact to determine the country allocation of
firms and wages. We describe the numerical implementation in detail in
Appendix B.2. In the following sections, we explore the results obtained
for the two models.
Before proceeding with the analysis, two important comments are in
order. First, one may wonder why we look at local size and accessibility
separately. Indeed, as shown in the literature, there is a theoretical link
between a measure of ‘market potential’ and the location of industry and
wages. Hence, we should use market potential as a theory-based deter-
minant of the equilibrium allocation. Yet, as is well known, the market
potential conflates size and accessibility (Head and Mayer, 2004), and
thus does not allow to separately investigate the contribution of each to
the equilibrium allocation. Since our objective is to disentangle the im-
pacts of size and of accessibility on the equilibrium, we cannot simply use
market potential in our subsequent analysis. Furthermore, as shown by
Behrens et al. (2007), there is a theoretical link between industry shares
and a measure of network centrality in some versions of this type of
model. Hence, looking at the impact of centrality is of theoretical interest
in its own right.
Second, to simplify matters we run non-linear regressions of equi-
librium outcomes on the exogenous measures of accessibility and local
size. We view these regressions as ‘comparative static’ exercises that
allow us to approximate the non-linear relations characterizing the
models. A natural option is to consider a flexible functional form that,
being twice continuously differentiable, can approximate any function to
the second order at an arbitrary point (constituting a specific Taylor
approximation).15 These regressions are a natural starting point in the
absence of any knowledge about the non-linear equilibrium relationships
and the way that accessibility and size can be theoretically separated.
When there are non-linear structural relationships in the theoretical
model and accessibility and size cannot be clearly separated, estimation
errors capture those aspects but have no other structural interpretation.
Our set of results is complemented with the calculation of average
marginal effects of accessibility and size on equilibriumwages and industry
locations. As shown in Section 2.3, since the comparative statics depend on
the equilibrium trade and specialization regimes, we provide results for
both the aggregatemodel and for the different types of nodes depending on
their patterns of specialization and trade. Finally, we depict the graphs of
two representative networks—one with preferential attachment and one
with equal probabilities—which allows us to highlight the role that
accessibility and size play in shaping specialization and trade patterns.(see, e.g., Xie and Levinson, 2008, for the case of the road network in Indiana).
Observe that we assign θi randomly, i.e., there is no systematic correlation be-
tween size and accessibility. The reason for that choice is that we want to study
the distribution of industry as a function of size and accessibility separately.
Introducing a systematic correlation between the two (though empirically
relevant since larger places that are better connected tend to grow larger; see
Duranton and Turner, 2012) is not required for our analysis.
15 Diewert (1971) formalized this notion of flexibility. Among the alternative
candidates allowing for a second-order approximation are the quadratic, the
generalized Leontief, or the translog functional forms (see, e.g., Thompson,
1988). We run regressions for these different functional forms but only report
the quadratic results based on goodness-of-fit criteria.
Table 1
Simple correlations for Model 1.
λi n

i w

i θi closenessi degreei
λi 1
ni 0.9987 1
wi 0.0849 0.0806 1
θi 0.8119 0.8065 0.0899 1
closenessi 0.2680 0.2693 0.1316 0.0134 1
degreei 0.3972 0.4023 0.1799 0.0135 0.7075 1
Notes:We set σ ¼ 5, μ¼ 0.4, and ξ¼ 0.7. See Section 4.1 for more details on those
choices. Simple correlations for 100 random tree networks with a random
number of 20–30 nodes. The table gives correlations at the level of individual
nodes (pooled across all 100 networks). The shares λi are given by λ

i ¼
ni =ð
P
jn

j Þ.
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We first compute simple correlations between the equilibriummasses
of firms in the different countries (ni ), their population shares (θi), and
their centrality (ci). The latter is measured either by the closeness cen-
trality in expression (30)—henceforth ‘closeness’, for short—or by the
node's degree—henceforth ‘degree’, for short. ‘Degree’ is simply
measured by the number of links of the node. Centrally located countries
have both a high value for closeness and for degree. This can be seen from
the correlations in Table 1. As expected, size (θi) and accessibility
(closenessi and degreei) are on average positively linked to a country's
equilibrium industry share (λi or, alternatively, n

i ). They are also on
average positively linked to a country's wage, wi , although this link is
much weaker (as suggested by our results in Section 2.3). Observe that
size is (relatively) more strongly linked to industry location, whereas
accessibility is (relatively) more strongly linked to wages. Put differently,
size differences map more strongly into differences in industry structure,
whereas accessibility differences translate more strongly into factor price
differences. It is finally of interest to note that the correlations between
the equilibrium industry shares, λi (or the equilibrium masses of firms,
ni ) and the equilibrium wages—though positive—are fairly small (0.080
and 0.085, respectively). This suggests that wages and industry location
shape the equilibrium outcome differently, depending crucially on the
observed patterns of specialization and trade.
To go beyond simple univariate correlations, we now run several
regressions to gauge the partial effect of increasing market size or cen-
trality of nodes on the equilibrium shares of manufacturing activity and
the equilibrium wages, controlling for accessibility and for size. In Model
1, there are two endogenous variables that can be analyzed in the re-
gressions: the equilibrium allocation of firms, λi , and the equilibrium
wages, wi .
16 We regress these two equilibrium outcomes on measures of:
(i) the node's centrality, as given by either closeness or degree; and (ii)
the node's local market size.17 We perform a pooled analysis with both
types of networks (based on preferential attachment, BA, or equal
probabilities)—in which case we include a network dummy indicating
the network type—and separate regressions for each type of network.
Formally, we estimate the following quadratic specifications
λi ¼ β0 þ β1centralityi þ β2centrality2i þ β3θi þ β4θ2i
þ β5ðcentralityi 
 θiÞ þ network_dummyi þ εi
(34)
wi ¼ γ0 þ γ1centralityi þ γ2centrality2i þ γ3θi þ γ4θ2i
þ γ5ðcentralityi 
 θiÞ þ network_dummyi þ εi
(35)
for all the nodes of the networks that we have generated.16 Due to the high correlation between λi and n

i (see Table 1), there is no
reason to look at the latter separately.
17 We do not include both measures of centrality simultaneously, because of
their high correlation (see Table 1).
9Table 2 summarizes our results for the estimations of (34) and (35).
As can be seen from that table, both centrality and market size have non-
linear effects on a node's equilibrium share of firms and its equilibrium
wage. Observe that the linear and the quadratic effects usually differ in
sign, with the value of the latter markedly exceeding that of the former.
Observe further that the cross effects are always positive for λi , whereas
they are always insignificant forwi . Hence, local size has a stronger effect
on industry location for nodes with high accessibility, whereas such an
effect does not arise for equilibrium wages. The average marginal effects
reported in the upper panel of Table 3 confirm that the empirical defi-
nition of the HME—defined here as a more than proportional increase in
industry shares in response to an increase in local market size—always
arises in both types of networks: ∂λi =∂θi > 1. As explained before, the
cross effect with accessibility reinforces this pattern. The HME thus
generally seems to hold in models without FPE and a large number of
locations (see also Zeng and Uchikawa, 2014). We have calculated
equivalent average marginal effects by the alternative regimes of node
specialization (see Table 4), and the HME always holds in its derivative
formulation. It is particularly strong for the central—completely spe-
cialized—nodes, and a robust result.
We now study the theoretical definition of the HME at the level of the
whole network. Following Behrens et al. (2009) and Zeng and Uchikawa
(2014), a network exhibits this effect if the following sequence of in-
equalities holds once countries are ordered by decreasing size—θ1 being
the largest country:
θ1 > θ2 >… > θM ⇒
λ*1
θ1
>
λ*2
θ2
>… >
λ*M
θM
(36)
Although (36) can theoretically hold for networks of any size under
very specific assumptions, it is expected that it is not verified in largemulti-
country settings like those corresponding to the random networks that we
generate. Indeed, it does not hold in a single of our 100 networks. How-
ever, a way to test whether there is a relevant ordering that might hold
statistically is to check if there exists somecorrelation between θi and λi =θi.
Out of the 100 networks, 90 exhibit positive and statistically significant
correlations, whose average coefficient is ρ ¼ 0:543. This shows that
while (36) does not hold strictly, a positive relationship exists between
market size and the relative share of production to demand in the differ-
entiated good.18 Fig. 3 graphs the relationship between these two vari-
ables, where the value of λ*i =θi (on the y-axis) is plotted against the value of
θi (on the x-axis). A very distinct cluster of nodes with λ*i =θi > 2 is clearly
visible. These are the countries enjoying a privileged position in the world
production and trading network and, fromFigs. 4 and 5 below, we see that
they correspond to nodes that completely specialize in the differentiated
sector because of the their central location in the network.
We can further explore and check the robustness of these results by
focusing on the values of λ*i =θi by node specialization, and selecting as
reference threshold a more than proportional share of production to
demand, i.e. λ*i =θi > 1. Note that, although (36) generally will not hold,
λ*i =θi > 1 must hold for at least some nodes in the network, i.e., some
nodes must have a disproportionate share of production. Fig. 4 shows
these distributions. The results for the completely specialized nodes,
presented in the left panels, are clear-cut. For this regime, 82.2% of the
nodes exhibit a more than proportional share of production to demand.
Furthermore, it is possible to identify a threshold value
θ i  0:001 ð0:1%Þ, above which all nodes exhibit λ*i =θi > 1. Both the
high percentage of nodes displaying this characteristic and the existence
of a threshold value are interesting results. As completely specialized
nodes emerge in themost central locations (hubs) of the trading networks18 These results are confirmed using Spearman's rank correlation between both
sets of variables. In this case, 98 out of 100 networks exhibit a positive corre-
lation with an average coefficient of 0.615. The remaining two correlations are
not statistically significant.
Table 2
Regression results for Model 1.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Dependent variable: λ*i
Closenessi 0.2505a
(12.677)
0.3653a
(12.586)
0.1795a
(7.769)
Closeness2i 0.1895
a
(13.892)
0.2805a
(14.078)
0.1260a
(7.883)
Degreei 0.0022a
(3.516)
0.0084a
(9.294)
0.0096a
(9.882)
Degree2i 0.0001c
(1.786)
0.0007a
(8.349)
0.0015a
(10.732)
θi 0.2006b
(2.429)
0.6493a
(15.604)
0.2756b
(2.188)
0.6625a
(10.122)
0.5413a
(5.844)
0.6614a
(14.107)
θ2i 1.9280
a
(3.625)
2.1178a
(5.015)
2.4084a
(2.866)
1.8730a
(2.684)
1.1918b
(2.079)
1.8009a
(4.067)
Closenessi
 θi 1.3266a
(12.688)
2.0438a
(12.317)
0.8932a
(7.893)
Degreei
 θi 0.1989a
(25.077)
0.1934a
(17.982)
0.2182a
(20.223)
Constant 0.0717a
(9.963)
0.0097a
(7.757)
0.1080a
(10.225)
0.0167a
(9.340)
0.0531a
(6.336)
0.0035b
(2.313)
Network type Both Both BA BA Equal Equal
Network dummy Yes Yes No No No No
Observations 2, 498 2, 498 1, 274 1, 274 1, 224 1, 224
Adjusted R2 0.760 0.849 0.754 0.831 0.830 0.899
Dependent variable: w*i
Closenessi 0.2118a
(4.018)
0.3139a
(5.245)
0.0491
(0.557)
Closeness2i 0.1934
a
(5.317)
0.2680a
(6.525)
0.0857
(1.406)
Degreei 0.0038c
(1.838)
0.0012
(0.544)
0.0029
(0.613)
Degree2i 0.0001
(0.665)
0.0004c
(1.799)
0.0004
(0.538)
θi 0.1219
(0.553)
0.4275a
(3.068)
0.3716
(1.431)
0.7246a
(4.457)
0.4239
(1.199)
0.1227
(0.531)
θ2i 6.4050
a
(4.515)
6.5170a
(4.609)
6.5982a
(3.808)
6.5911a
(3.803)
5.2136b
(2.384)
5.7051a
(2.616)
Closenessi
 θi 0.3996
(1.433)
0.5192
(1.517)
0.6072
(1.406)
Degreei
 θi 0.0194
(0.732)
0.0105
(0.395)
0.0552
(1.039)
Constant 1.0524a
(54.786)
0.9926a
(237.347)
1.0890a
(49.996)
0.9979a
(224.726)
0.9804a
(30.645)
0.9800a
(129.737)
Network type Both Both BA BA Equal Equal
Network dummy Yes Yes No No No No
Observations 2, 498 2, 498 1, 274 1, 274 1, 224 1, 224
Adjusted R2 0.052 0.058 0.063 0.065 0.066 0.074
Notes:We set σ ¼ 5, μ¼ 0.4, and ξ¼ 0.7. OLS regressions. BA denotes networks generated using the Barabasi and Albert (1999) algorithm. T-stats in parentheses. a, b, and
c denote coefficients significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
J. Barbero et al. Regional Science and Urban Economics 71 (2018) 1–24(see Fig. 5), these results imply that a more than proportional share of
production to that of population is a distinctive feature of key nodes
within a network regardless of their market size (i.e., those with the
highest accessibility). This is not, however, a feature that is generally
observed for the remaining specialization regimes and majority of nodes.
Across the whole network—for the alternative regimes of incomplete
specialization and complete diversification—the percentage of nodes
exhibiting more than proportional values, λ*i =θi > 1, falls substantially,
and there is no market size threshold separating the spatial equilibria
according to this value.19,2019 Other relevant results are the magnitudes of λ*i =θi, much larger in the
completely specialized nodes, as well as the non-linear positive relationship
between this ratio and market size, clearly visible in the lower panel for the
nodes where λ*i =θi < 1:
20 The results are identical when using the mass of firms, ni , instead of the
share of firms, λi .
10Turning to Table 3, as predicted by theory, both measures of cen-
trality—closeness and degree—have a significant positive association
with the equilibrium allocation of firms across countries, as captured by
their average marginal impact. The results pertaining to the equilibrium
wages in the bottom panels of Tables 2 and 3 deserve special attention.
First, as can be seen, the two measures of centrality are positively linked
to a country's equilibriumwage in a non-linear way given their linear and
quadratic coefficients, with the predominant effect, corresponding to the
marginal effects, being positive. In other words, more centrally located
countries with better market access command higher wages, which is in
line with predictions of new economic geography models and with
empirical evidence (see, e.g., Mion, 2004, for Italy; and Hanson, 2005, for
the US).
Second, the correlation between wi and θi is quite low—though still
positive—as reported in Table 1. A larger local market is weakly asso-
ciated with higher wages, except in hub-and-spoke type BA networks
where the effect is on average negative (see columns (iii) and (iv) of
Tables 2 and 3). This latter result is surprising and requires some further
Table 3
Marginal effects for Model 1.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Average marginal effect on λ*i
Closenessi 0.0461a
(15.56)
0.0697a
(15.12)
0.0217a
(6.77)
Degreei 0.0097a
(31.78)
0.0135a
(28.07)
0.0048a
(13.11)
θi 1.2074a
(79.02)
1.2007a
(98.89)
1.2038a
(52.25)
1.1838a
(61.97)
1.2228a
(71.27)
1.2246a
(92.39)
Network type Both Both BA BA Equal Equal
Average marginal effect on w*i
Closenessi 0.0208a
(2.63)
0.0028
(0.30)
0.0391a
(3.20)
Degreei 0.0051a
(4.96)
0.0030b
(2.55)
0.0065a
(3.64)
θi 0.1341a
(3.29)
0.1316a
(3.24)
0.1701a
(3.58)
0.1767a
(3.72)
0.4429a
(6.77)
0.4401a
(6.74)
Network type Both Both BA BA Equal Equal
Notes: We set σ ¼ 5, μ¼ 0.4, and ξ¼ 0.7. T-statistics are given in parentheses. a, b, and c denote coefficients significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Table 4
Number of occurrences of each specialization pattern for the different nodes.
Node type # nodes % nodes θi w

i
Barabasi and Albert
Complete specialization 122 10% 0.0314 1.0001
Incomplete specialization 815 64% 0.0472 0.9848
Complete diversification 126 10% 0.0467 0.9885
Only homogeneous good 211 17% 0.0132 0.9978
Equal probability
Complete specialization 41 3% 0.0247 1.0113
Incomplete specialization 902 74% 0.0463 0.9990
Complete diversification 91 7% 0.0479 1.0044
Only homogeneous good 190 16% 0.0099 0.9958
Notes: Breakdown of individual nodes by specialization type. The sample is the
same than that used for the regression analysis. θi and wi denote the average
market size and the average equilibrium wages of the types of nodes.
Fig. 3. Ratio of relative shares of production to market size, λ*i =θi, all nodes. 21 Recall that if country i imports some of the homogeneous good from country
j, the relative wage wi/wj in the two countries just depends on the relative trade
costs τji/τii, but it is independent of market sizes θi and θj. In other words, it is
just the structure of the trading network that matters, but not the distribution of
market sizes.
22 Recall that there are less fully specialized nodes in the case of equal prob-
ability networks. Hence, sample sizes are smaller there, which may explain the
lack of precision in the estimates.
J. Barbero et al. Regional Science and Urban Economics 71 (2018) 1–24explanation relating the type of network (preferential attachment or
equal probability) to the alternative regimes of node specialization or
diversification. As can be seen from Table 4, the ‘hub-and-spoke’ topol-
ogy mostly generated by the BA algorithm supports more completely
specialized nodes—with more of the differentiated sector at the core of11the trading network and more of the homogeneous sector as we move to
the periphery. As shown in Section 2.3.1, complete specialization tends
to lead to a negative association between equilibrium wages and local
market size, and this effect seems to be strong enough on average in the
BA networks to lead to negative coefficient estimates.21 Indeed, focusing
on all networks, 7% of nodes are completely specialized in the differ-
entiated sector, 16% in the homogenous sector, and 69% are not fully
specialized producing both goods and importing the homogeneous good.
Finally, only 9% of the nodes are fully diversified in both sectors. For BA
networks, these percentages are higher for the case of complete
specialization, and smaller for incompletely specialized nodes. They are
similar in the remaining cases.
To better see the difference in the patterns induced by the two
network structures, we depict the different equilibrium types of nodes in
Fig. 5. As one can see, in both types of networks the most central nodes
specialize in the differentiated good—regardless of their size—while the
most peripheral regions specialize in the homogeneous good. The latter
holds particularly true in BA networks. As one can further see from Fig. 5,
the case of incomplete specialization is the most frequent in both network
types, while complete diversification can hardly be observed in the two
networks. Since only the latter type is clearly associated with a positive
link between local market size and equilibrium wages, this may explain
why we find on average no strong correlation between those two vari-
ables in our simulations.
Based on the alternative equilibrium specialization regimes, we run
separate regressions corresponding to (35) and report their marginal
effects in Table 5. For nodes with complete specialization in the homo-
geneous good (bottom panel of Table 5), the negative effect of size on
wages is not statistically different from zero (or at best marginally sig-
nificant). It is, however, strongly significant for nodes specialized in the
differentiated sector in BA networks (top panel), which drives the highly
significant average effect.22 For nodes not specialized in either good
(middle panel), the effect is positive in the equal probability networks,
whereas it is insignificant in the BA networks. This result is the only one
that does not seem in line with the analytical results derived in a
Fig. 4. Ratio of relative shares of production to market size, λ*i =θi, by node specialization pattern. Notes: Regimes are vertically aligned in decreasing order of the
percentage of nodes exhibiting λ*i =θi > 1 (reported in the headings). Nodes exhibiting λ
*
i =θi > 1 are shown in the top panels, while the remaining nodes are shown in
the bottom panels (0 < λ*i =θi  1).
Fig. 5. Node specialization patterns, BA (left panel) and equal probability (right panel). Note: Numbers represent rounded population shares (in percentages). Missing
numbers indicate small shares that would round to zero. The length of the links between nodes is not kept equal to illustrate clusters in the network topology and
prevent visual cluttering.
23 This result probably explains why the model cannot generate too much
dispersion in relative wages—since those are constrained by trade costs differ-
ences—when applied to real data, which are not that large between European
Union countries (see Section 4 below).
J. Barbero et al. Regional Science and Urban Economics 71 (2018) 1–24simplified version of the model in Section 2.3.1, where we have shown
that wages were independent from local market size. A positive relation
emerges in the general case, and that relation is driven by the equal
probability networks.
As explained before, pooling across all types of nodes allows only to
compute average effects, and those average effects can go either way
depending on the shares of node types. This explains the weak link be-
tween size and wages. To see how the theoretical result derived with
three countries extends to the general case with many countries, we
compute the correlation between θi and wi for the countries that are
specialized in the differentiated good. In that case the correlation in-
creases from 0.09 to about 0.4. This result clearly shows that costly trade
in the homogeneous good imposes strong restrictions on relative wages,
and those restrictions partly destroy the positive link between market12size and equilibrium wages.23
To sum up, our findings suggest that any analysis focusing on two
countries only or disregarding the spatial structure of the trading
network is likely to miss an important part of the story. Depending on the
trading network, countries will display different specialization and trade
patterns, and those patterns yield different relationships between local
market size and equilibrium wages. Hence, the relationship between
market size and wages is necessarily weaker than the relationship
Table 5
Average marginal effect on w*i by type of node specialization.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Nodes specialized in the differentiated good
Closenessi 0.1696a
(6.03)
0.2048a
(7.71)
0.0177
(0.16)
Degreei 0.0118a
(8.33)
0.0120a
(10.71)
0.0124c
(1.71)
θi 0.5901a
(3.10)
0.6486a
(3.88)
0.4514a
(2.60)
0.5443a
(3.66)
0.6510
(0.93)
1.2198b
(2.13)
Network type Both Both BA BA Equal Equal
Observations 163 163 122 122 41 41
Nodes incompletely specialized or completely diversified
Closenessi 0.0009
(0.11)
0.0288a
(2.88)
0.0245b
(2.01)
Degreei 0.0041a
(3.08)
0.0011
(0.65)
0.0044b
(2.24)
θi 0.3996a
(8.83)
0.3895a
(8.64)
0.0065
(0.13)
0.0157
(0.31)
0.7829a
(10.86)
0.7871a
(11.09)
Network type Both Both BA BA Equal Equal
Observations 1934 1934 941 941 993 993
Nodes specialized in the homogeneous good
Closenessi 0.1101a
(3.38)
0.1164a
(2.67)
0.0784
(1.62)
Degreei 0.0119b
(2.06)
0.0158c
(1.91)
0.0083
(1.04)
θi 0.5713
(1.14)
0.4646
(0.92)
0.6430
(1.24)
0.6001
(1.16)
1.0125
(0.98)
1.0505
(0.99)
Network type Both Both BA BA Equal Equal
Observations 401 401 211 211 190 190
Notes: We set σ ¼ 5, μ¼ 0.4, and ξ¼ 0.7. T-statistics are given in parentheses. a, b, and c denote coefficients significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
J. Barbero et al. Regional Science and Urban Economics 71 (2018) 1–24between market size and industry location. We have shown this result
theoretically in simple versions of the model, and we confirmed it
numerically using a large set of simulations of more complex versions of
the model. In our regressions, we generally obtain high values for the R2s
for the distribution of economic activity, whereas they are substantially
lower for the wage relationship. Since the R2s for equilibrium industry
location are high, but the R2s for wages are low—while the regressors are
the same in both models—this suggests that size and accessibility can be
relatively well separated from one another, whereas equilibrium wages
are much more non-linear than equilibrium industry locations.24
3.2. Model 2: numerical results
We now look at the case with two differentiated CES industries. As
shown in Section 2.3.1, we can obtain sharp theoretical results in special
cases, involving especially two countries and specific symmetries in
expenditure shares. Unfortunately, we have not been able to derive sharp
resultswith less restrictive assumptions. In particular, it is not clearwhether
or not we can cleanly separate the effects of ‘absolute’ and of ‘comparative’
size differences. We know that the former leads to a positive relationship
between local market size and wages, whereas the latter leads to a positive
relationship between local spending patterns and industry location. We
thus expect that the equilibrium results in more complex cases are a com-
bination of both, butwedonot know towhat degree. Given thatwehave no24 We also estimated linear versions of the models, and the results in terms of
the relative R2s are similar. Hence, the relationship between local size and in-
dustry location seems to be ‘fairly linear.’ As shown by Behrens et al. (2009,
p.262), theory predicts a linear relationship between the distribution of eco-
nomic activity (λi) and market size (θi) at an interior equilibrium in the model
with FPE, regardless of the number of countries and the trade cost matrix. Our
results suggest that this results continues to hold approximately true and that the
relationship remains fairly linear even without FPE.
13theoretical guidance, we hence resort to numerical simulations which are
the best direction to infer the possible average relationships between
equilibrium industry shares and wages and the centrality and size of
countries. To the best of our knowledge, this case has not been investigated
until nowwithmultiple countries.With two differentiated sectors, we have
to examine the spatial distribution of firms in both sectors, λ1i  n1i=
ðPjn1jÞ and λ2i  n2i=ðPjn2jÞ, as well as the equilibrium wages wi . Simple
correlations among the equilibrium values are presented in Table 6.
As can be seen from Table 6, as expected size and accessibility are
strongly positively linked to the equilibrium industry shares and to the
equilibrium wages, respectively. Although market size still positively
influences wages, there is almost no correlation between our measures of
centrality and the shares of firms in the two industries. As can further be
seen, there is country specialization, as shown by the negative correlation
between the equilibrium shares in both industries, as well as the positive
correlation with the own expenditure share, and the negative correlation
with the other industry's expenditure share. In words, this specialization
is strongly driven by differences in local spending patterns, as shown in
the last two lines of Table 6. Our finding thus extends the result on
‘comparative advantage’ to a multi-country setting. Note, finally, that
market size has roughly the same positive impact on industry location in
both industries conditional on expenditure shares. This is the manifesta-
tion of market size as ‘absolute advantage’, which states that more cen-
trally located countries should have, ceteris paribus, higher wages.
As forModel 1 in the previous section,we run the same regressions (34)
and (35).We now run them separately for the equilibrium shares offirms in
each of the two sectors, λ1i and λ

2i. We also control for the country-specific
share of expenditure on the two differentiated sectors, μ1i and μ2i.25 Table 725 These shares are also randomly assigned to countries. Since these expendi-
ture shares sum by definition to one, only one of the shares is included in the
regressions.
Table 6
Simple correlations for Model 2.
λ1i λ

2i w

i θi closenessi degreei μ1i μ2i
λ1i 1
λ2i 0.2194 1
wi 0.3202 0.3397 1
θi 0.6134 0.6261 0.5314 1
closenessi 0.0008 0.0199 0.2916 0.0134 1
degreei 0.0004 0.0182 0.3295 0.0135 0.7075 1
μ1i 0.6470 0.6587 0.0183 0.0157 0.0072 0.0004 1
μ2i 0.6470 0.6587 0.0183 0.0157 0.0072 0.0004 1.0000 1
Notes: We set σ ¼ 5. Simple correlations for 100 random tree networks with a random number of 20–30 nodes. The table gives correlations at the level of individual
nodes (pooled across all 100 networks). The shares λsi are computed as λ

si ¼ nsi=ð
P
jn

sjÞ, for s¼ 1, 2.
Table 7
Regression results for Model 2 (industry shares).
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Dependent variable: λ*1i
Closenessi 0.0426b
(2.297)
0.0427c
(1.706)
0.0446
(1.595)
Closeness2i 0.0300
b
(2.342)
0.0292c
(1.701)
0.0322c
(1.664)
Degreei 0.0003
(0.450)
0.0007
(0.728)
0.0003
(0.188)
Degree2i 0.0001
(0.840)
0.0001
(1.249)
0.0001
(0.313)
θi 1.1836a
(15.263)
1.1353a
(23.053)
1.2301a
(11.331)
1.1383a
(16.719)
1.1354a
(10.117)
1.1199a
(15.193)
θ2i 1.4622a
(2.930)
1.4805a
(2.963)
1.3027c
(1.799)
1.2748c
(1.756)
1.5630b
(2.251)
1.5877b
(2.281)
Closenessi
 θi 0.1055
(1.074)
0.1835
(1.283)
0.0337
(0.246)
Degreei
 θi 0.0089
(0.953)
0.0123
(1.103)
0.0028
(0.163)
μ1i 0.1067a
(74.845)
0.1067a
(74.771)
0.1089a
(55.248)
0.1091a
(55.263)
0.1045a
(50.553)
0.1044a
(50.461)
Constant 0.0694a
(10.230)
0.0548a
(33.546)
0.0714a
(7.823)
0.0562a
(26.732)
0.0683a
(6.696)
0.0537a
(20.686)
Network type Both Both BA BA Equal Equal
Network dummy Yes Yes No No No No
Observations 2, 498 2, 498 1, 274 1, 274 1, 224 1, 224
Adjusted R2 0.808 0.808 0.814 0.814 0.802 0.802
Dependent variable: λ*2i
Closenessi 0.0466b
(2.509)
0.0474c
(1.913)
0.0475c
(1.676)
Closeness2i 0.0328
b
(2.560)
0.0332c
(1.953)
0.0338c
(1.721)
Degreei 0.0000
(0.032)
0.0000
(0.037)
0.0001
(0.095)
Degree2i 0.0000
(0.292)
0.0000
(0.386)
0.0000
(0.160)
θi 0.8199a
(10.548)
0.8818a
(17.852)
0.7807a
(7.262)
0.8725a
(12.925)
0.8643a
(7.591)
0.8996a
(12.026)
θ2i 0.9869
b
(1.973)
1.0122b
(2.020)
0.8775
(1.223)
0.8891
(1.235)
1.0313
(1.464)
1.0658
(1.509)
Closenessi
 θi 0.1343
(1.365)
0.1917
(1.353)
0.0787
(0.566)
Degreei
 θi 0.0114
(1.214)
0.0136
(1.222)
0.0073
(0.423)
μ2i 0.1073a
(75.053)
0.1073a
(74.929)
0.1086a
(55.626)
0.1087a
(55.564)
0.1059a
(50.517)
0.1058a
(50.416)
Constant 0.0361a
(5.286)
0.0516a
(31.176)
0.0358a
(3.931)
0.0517a
(24.717)
0.0356a
(3.443)
0.0516a
(19.233)
Network type Both Both BA BA Equal Equal
Network dummy Yes Yes No No No No
Observations 2, 498 2, 498 1, 274 1, 274 1, 224 1, 224
Adjusted R2 0.814 0.813 0.821 0.821 0.806 0.805
Notes:We set σ ¼ 5. OLS regressions. BA denotes networks generated using the Barabasi and Albert (1999) algorithm. T-stats in parentheses. a, b, and c denote coefficients
significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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J. Barbero et al. Regional Science and Urban Economics 71 (2018) 1–24shows that market size, θi, and the expenditure share for the two differen-
tiated sectors, μ1i and μ2i, are the key variables that explain in a (mostly)
linearway the spatial distribution λ1i and λ

2i offirms in the two sectors (note
that the quadratic terms for the expenditure shares are never significant and
we hence drop them from the regressions). The positive average effect of
market size, as shown by its associatedmarginal effect in Table 9, is clearly
driven by the labor market clearing condition (23) which requires that the
number of firms in the two sectors sums to the population share. Once we
control for local market size and the spending patterns, the centrality of a
country is no longer associated with its industry share. The reason is that
centrality affects both industries in the sameway, i.e., accessibility is akin to
an absolute Ricardian advantage and is, therefore, capitalized into factor
prices.26
Turning next to wages, both market size, θi, and centrality are posi-
tively linked to wages, wi , as shown by Table 8. Countries with better
access to markets and/or more trading links tend to have higher wages.
Note also that the expenditure shares μsi are nowhere near statistical
significance in our wage regressions. In words, different expenditure
shares affect industries differentially and, therefore, have no strong effect
on country wages. This is again in line with our analytical results on
comparative and absolute advantage.27 When taken together, our find-
ings suggest that the key analytical properties of the two-country model
extend to multiple asymmetric countries. Finally, observe that the R2s are
much higher for the wage equation in the model with two differentiated
sectors as compared to the model with a homogeneous good. This con-
firms that the non-linear relationships between size and wages or
accessibility and wages can be better captured in the secondmodel by the
quadratic specification than in the former one. The absence of a homo-
geneous sector—and thus the absence of the strong restriction that sector
imposes on cross-country wage differences—allows for a much cleaner
average effect of local market size on wages.
To summarize, expenditure patterns (and local market size) determine
the structure of country specialization in the two industries in Model 2,
whereas local market size (and accessibility) have a strong impact on
wages. Observe that a home market effect—when defined as a more than
proportional increase in industry shares in response to an increase in local
market size, i.e., ∂λi =∂θi > 1—generally does not arise, as shown in
Table 9. The reason is that when all sectors are operating under increasing
returns and face trade costs, not all of them can—by definition—exhibit
home market effects (see also Hanson and Xiang, 2004). In that case, an
alternative definition of the HME, involving both the size θi and the
expenditure share μsi, would be required. To the best of our knowledge,
such a definition has not been used to date in the literature.
3.3. Summary of the simulation results
A number of findings emerge from the foregoing analyses of the two
models. Let us briefly summarize the key insights. First, starting from
Model 1 with a single CES sector, we have seen that accessibility has a
strong impact on industry location and, to a lesser extent, on wages. This
suggests that any analysis involving trade in homogeneous goods and26 This result would be weakened if accessibility affected industries in different
ways (as in, e.g., Hanson and Xiang, 2004). In that case, accessibility would also
be in part a ‘comparative advantage’ and would, therefore, have a much
stronger impact on industry location and not only wages.
27 We performed extensive sensitivity analyses with respect to σ and μ1i and μ2i
in Model 2. Holding the network structure constant, we study the behavior of
industry location (λ1i and λ2i) and country wages, wi, when these basic param-
eters change. The results consistently show that increasing σ in the range (1, 10]
leads to higher nominal wages, while industry shares remain largely unaffected.
In accord with the regression results that we report in the main text, the income
shares map into the specialization. Solving a hundred times the model for each
specific network and assigning random values of μ1i and μ2i, we find that in-
dustry shares present a strong correlation with income shares (ρ¼ 0.7). Income
shares, however, are basically uncorrelated with nominal wages.
15focusing on two countries only—or disregarding the spatial structure of
the trading network entirely—is likely to miss an important part of the
story. Secondly, we have shown that the correlations between wi and
either λi or θi are quite low, i.e., there is no strong correlation between
either market size or the equilibrium industry shares and the equilibrium
wages. As we have explained and theoretically shown, this unexpected
result is most likely due to the fact that different specialization patterns
impose strong restrictions on the relative wages of the trading partners,
which breaks the clear link between market size and wages. Although
this result needs to be partly qualified—see the results in the middle
panel of Table 5—we believe that it is largely driven by these differences
in node types: for many pairs of nodes, relative wages depend on relative
trade costs only but are (partly or fully) independent of the countries'
market sizes. This finding once more suggests that going beyond the two-
country case is very important. More work is called for here. Last, the
home market effect—when defined as a more than one-for-one increase
in industry shares in response to changes in local market size—generally
holds even when trading the homogeneous good is costly, provided that
it is less costly than trading the differentiated good (as in Davis, 1998).
Turning to Model 2 with two CES sectors, both absolute market
size—as captured by θi—and centrality—as measured by either closeness
or the degree distribution—are capitalized into factor prices, thus
showing that they constitute absolute advantage affecting all industries
in the same way. Differences in spending patterns—as captured by the
μsi—are however capitalized into industry structure, thus showing that
they constitute comparative advantage affecting industries differently.
Our findings, therefore, numerically extend the theoretical results of
Behrens and Ottaviano (2011) to a multi-country setting.
Last, it is worth pointing out that the effects of accessibility and
market size on wages are an order of magnitude smaller in Model 1 than
in Model 2 (compare Tables 3 and 9). As explained, the reason is that the
equalization of prices in the traded homogeneous sector imposes strong
restrictions on the determination of wages among trading partners when
specialization is incomplete (a very frequent case). This in turn breaks the
link between accessibility and market size in the wage determination. In
a nutshell, as expected market size and centrality matter more the more
industries are subject to trade costs and increasing returns to scale, as is
the case in Model 2 of our analysis. This suggests that any empirical
analysis needs to focus on the ‘right set’ of industries.
4. Numerical application to EU countries
Our foregoing simulations highlight regularities of multi-country
trade models without FPE, yet they cannot provide a sense of how well
those models perform when confronted with data. The aim of this section
is hence to use ‘calibrated’ versions of the models to check their fit with
the data and to run some counterfactuals.4.1. Data
We compute the equilibria of the two models using country-level data
for 25 European Union (EU) countries in 2001 and 2012.28,29 Table 12 in
Appendix C provides details on the variables used to solve the different
models. For both models, these include the population shares (θi) and
‘trade costs’ (τij), which we proxy using population and minimum travel28 We initially have 28 EU countries, but we exclude Lithuania due to missing
data, and Cyprus and Malta because of their insular nature that affects the
computation of minimum-time road travel distance.
29 In a supplemental online appendix, we also provide an application to
Spanish regions. The advantage of the Spanish case is that we focus on one
country and, therefore, have less heterogeneity that may affect our results. We
also have a better (and more direct) measure for transport costs. However, the
assumption of immobile population is obviously much less realistic for the
Spanish case as compared to the EU case.
Table 8
Regression results for Model 2 (wages).
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Dependent variable: w*i
Closenessi 0.0827
(1.040)
0.0687
(0.576)
0.1076
(1.038)
Closeness2i 0.2613
a
(4.763)
0.2888a
(3.524)
0.2489a
(3.468)
Degreei 0.0373a
(12.176)
0.0342a
(7.696)
0.0373a
(6.863)
Degree2i 0.0011a
(3.573)
0.0009b
(2.114)
0.0006
(0.828)
θi 5.0415a
(15.169)
3.9362a
(19.053)
4.8117a
(9.288)
3.5859a
(11.109)
5.4439a
(13.081)
4.3179a
(16.392)
θ2i 16.3637a
(7.649)
16.5993a
(7.919)
13.9718a
(4.043)
15.0340a
(4.369)
19.2477a
(7.475)
18.4263a
(7.408)
Closenessi
 θi 2.4894a
(5.917)
2.8056a
(4.110)
2.3729a
(4.669)
Degreei
 θi 0.2533a
(6.432)
0.2405a
(4.531)
0.2709a
(4.472)
μ1i 0.0061
(0.997)
0.0055
(0.922)
0.0071
(0.759)
0.0085
(0.909)
0.0061
(0.795)
0.0029
(0.389)
Constant 0.7982a
(27.445)
0.7943a
(115.967)
0.7801a
(17.907)
0.7967a
(79.922)
0.8074a
(21.334)
0.7808a
(84.090)
Network type Both Both BA BA Equal Equal
Network dummy Yes Yes No No No No
Observations 2, 498 2, 498 1, 274 1, 274 1, 224 1, 224
Adjusted R2 0.393 0.417 0.330 0.337 0.477 0.513
Notes:We set σ ¼ 5. OLS regressions. BA denotes networks generated using the Barabasi and Albert (1999) algorithm. T-stats in parentheses. a, b, and c denote coefficients
significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Table 9
Marginal effects for Model 2.
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Average marginal effect for λ*1i
Closenessi 0.0001
(0.05)
0.0014
(0.36)
0.0010
(0.26)
Degreei 0.0005
(1.27)
0.0008
(1.54)
0.0001
(0.14)
θi 0.9988a
(69.65)
0.9996a
(69.57)
1.0102a
(50.87)
1.0126a
(50.94)
0.9881a
(47.58)
0.9874a
(47.42)
Network type Both Both BA BA Equal Equal
Average marginal effect for λ*2i
Closenessi 0.0010
(0.34)
0.0021
(0.53)
0.0001
(0.01)
Degreei 0.0004
(0.98)
0.0005
(0.91)
0.0003
(0.53)
θi 0.9852a
(68.54)
0.9848a
(68.33)
0.9716a
(49.40)
0.9697a
(49.20)
0.9985a
(47.39)
0.9989a
(47.27)
Network type Both Both BA BA Equal Equal
Average marginal effect for w*i
Closenessi 0.1535a
(12.89)
0.1825a
(9.64)
0.0213a
(8.98)
0.1240a
(8.63)
0.0240a
(11.80)
Degreei 0.0231a
(15.20)
0.0213a
(8.98)
0.0240a
(11.80)
θi 2.1318a
(34.68)
2.1210a
(35.19)
1.9269a
(20.33)
1.9206a
(20.38)
2.3459a
(30.46)
2.3224a
(31.21)
Network type Both Both BA BA Equal Equal
Notes: T-statistics are given in parentheses. a, b, and c denote coefficients significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
J. Barbero et al. Regional Science and Urban Economics 71 (2018) 1–24time by road, respectively. For the latter, following the definition of the
freeness of trade, ϕij, transport costs are computed as follows: ϕij ¼
τ1σij ¼

Timeij=minfTimeijg
1σ 2 ½0;1: For Model 1, we associate the
16homogeneous sector with agriculture, while the differentiated sector
corresponds to the manufacturing industry. The share of gross value
added in the differentiated sector is used to proxy the observed ni or λi,
which we will contrast with the equilibrium values ni or λ

i , backed out
Table 10
Simulation results for Model 1 and Model 2.
Country Model 1 Model 2
λ*i w
*
i λ
*
1i λ
*
2i w
*
i
2001 2012 2001 2012 2001 2012 2001 2012 2001 2012
(AT) Austria 0.021 0.016 1.000 1.000 0.015 0.016 0.021 0.022 1.000 1.000
(BE) Belgium 0.000 0.008 1.163 1.016 0.019 0.019 0.021 0.023 1.065 1.053
(BG) Bulgaria 0.015 0.017 0.941 0.533 0.020 0.020 0.009 0.009 0.963 0.963
(CZ) Czech Republic 0.022 0.021 1.011 0.981 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.023 1.027 1.022
(DE) Germany 0.185 0.188 1.246 1.182 0.175 0.178 0.200 0.202 1.274 1.273
(DK) Denmark 0.013 0.010 0.916 1.16 0.013 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.949 0.94
(EE) Estonia 0.003 0.001 0.811 2.084 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.808 0.806
(EL) Greece 0.020 0.018 0.963 0.612 0.02 0.018 0.021 0.019 0.993 0.978
(ES) Spain 0.080 0.082 1.123 1.016 0.083 0.086 0.077 0.079 1.158 1.159
(FI) Finland 0.011 0.012 0.975 0.862 0.010 0.010 0.013 0.013 0.954 0.96
(FR) France 0.123 0.124 1.223 1.052 0.116 0.117 0.133 0.133 1.214 1.212
(HR) Croatia 0.007 0.007 0.917 0.864 0.008 0.009 0.005 0.005 0.883 0.887
(HU) Hungary 0.018 0.016 0.993 0.867 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.997 0.988
(IE) Ireland 0.008 0.007 0.884 1.630 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.900 0.898
(IT) Italy 0.107 0.110 1.200 0.910 0.114 0.117 0.097 0.099 1.194 1.195
(LU) Luxembourg 0.000 0.000 1.318 1.353 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 1.009 1.013
(LV) Latvia 0.004 0.004 0.85 1.453 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.848 0.836
(NL) Netherlands 0.062 0.054 1.036 0.98 0.033 0.034 0.047 0.046 1.100 1.094
(PL) Poland 0.066 0.071 1.113 1.049 0.078 0.082 0.051 0.053 1.135 1.139
(PT) Portugal 0.024 0.021 0.984 0.86 0.022 0.019 0.027 0.023 1.014 0.997
(RO) Romania 0.051 0.041 1.078 0.687 0.069 0.054 0.025 0.02 1.101 1.068
(SE) Sweden 0.020 0.021 0.987 0.755 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.021 0.996 0.995
(SI) Slovenia 0.000 0.005 1.012 0.832 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.882 0.871
(SK) Slovakia 0.010 0.013 0.938 0.807 0.012 0.012 0.007 0.008 0.944 0.946
(UK) United Kingdom 0.129 0.133 1.209 1.214 0.113 0.116 0.152 0.155 1.220 1.221
Mean 0.040 0.040 1.036 1.030 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 1.025 1.020
Std. Dev 0.049 0.050 0.132 0.333 0.047 0.048 0.052 0.053 0.124 0.124
Max 0.185 0.188 1.318 2.084 0.175 0.178 0.200 0.202 1.274 1.273
Min 0.000 0.000 0.811 0.533 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.808 0.806
Notes: Simulations use the following values. For Model 1, we let σ ¼ 5, μ¼ 0.4, and ξ¼ 0.7. For Model 2, we let σ ¼ 5. See Appendix C for the raw data used in the
simulations.
Fig. 6. Observed and predicted manufacturing distributions for Model 1.
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manufacturing and with services gross value added, respectively.30
Population and industrial gross value added for 2012 are obtained from
the European Union Open Data Portal.31 Bilateral trade costs are30 We leave out agriculture from the analysis. We determine expenditure
shares to match the production side from the overall structure of consumption
expenditure by detailed COICOP level, with the first share corresponding to
manufacturing and utilities (processed food, clothing, water, electricity,…) and
the second one to services (health, communication, leisure, education, accom-
modation, …).
31 Available at https://open-data.europa.eu/data/dataset.
17measured as the time needed for traveling between origin i and desti-
nation j, assuming cost minimizing behavior. Using data provided by
Stelder et al. (2013) and ArcGIS, we compute proxies for bilateral
transport costs between EU countries using digitized road and maritime
transportation networks. These trade cost proxies are based on
shortest-route travel time between country centroids (see also Stelder,
2016). Consistent with the results presented in Spiekermann and
Wegener (2008), Germany has the highest closeness centrality within the
original members of the EU, followed by the most central countries in the
current EU, in particular the Czech Republic (0.99) and Austria (0.98).
The lowest centrality is for peripheral countries such as Finland (0.41),
Portugal (0.45), and Ireland (0.48). In Table 12, we report the value of
the centrality index for each country computed using this particular
time-cost proxy for trade costs.
As for the remaining structural parameters, μ and σ, of the models we
use key estimates reported in the literature that have proved robust in
several country studies (e.g., Table 5 in Head and Mayer, 2004). More
recently, Broda and Weinstein (2006) estimate the elasticities of substi-
tution for traded goods imports to the US using SITC rev2 for 1972–1988,
and SITC rev3 for 1990–2001 at the 3-, 4-, and 5-digit levels, respec-
tively. At the 3-digit level and across all goods, they find a mean elasticity
of 6.8 from 1972–1988 and of 4.0 from 1990–2001, respectively. Look-
ing only at differentiated goods—as defined using the Rauch (1999)
classification—at the 4-digit level, they find a mean elasticity of 5.2 from
1972–1988 and of 4.7 from 1990–2001, respectively. Therefore we take
a midpoint value of σ ¼ 5 (as we also assumed in the numerical simula-
tions performed in the previous sections). Turning to the expenditure
shares on the differentiated products, μ1i and μ2i, we use the expenditure
shares for manufacturing goods and services in total domestic demand
from the European Union Open Data Portal for each country in 2012. For
Model 1 we round the value to μ¼ 0.4 (as we also assumed in the nu-
merical simulations).
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18As for the parameter ξ capturing the relative level of trade cost of the
homogeneous good compared to the differentiated good, we adopt a
value 0.7. Based on data from the ‘Ongoing Survey on Freight Road
Transportation’, carried out by the Ministry of Transport in Spain under
European Union guidelines (see Ministerio de Fomento, MFOM, 2007a),
we can calculate a comparative range of relative freight costs in terms of
tons-kilometer.32 The difference in the cost of shipping homogeneous
and differentiated products ranges from 0.7 to 1, with an average around
0.8. To keep consistency with the values adopted in the previous section,
we take the lower bound for ξ.
Last, since wages are endogenous, we require additional data to test
whether the results of the calibrated model match the observed values. In
particular, we need information on wages. The latter are obtained, as in
many previous studies, by dividing aggregate gross value added by total
employment (see the literature review in Head and Mayer, 2004).4.2. Equilibrium distributions vs. observed distributions
We compare the equilibrium distribution of economic activity and the
wages predicted by our models with the data, taking country sizes (i.e.,
the θi's) and the transportation network (i.e., the τij's) as primitives. Doing
so will allow us to assess to what extent the models can ‘replicate’ the
observed distributions of wages and industries.
The equilibrium distributions of firms in 2001 and 2012, as well as
the equilibrium wages, are summarized in Table 10. Our results show
large disparities in the distribution of manufacturing across countries.
The distribution of firms varies from almost 0% to about 18%. Unsur-
prisingly, the largest EU countries have the largest shares of firms in both
models. To tentatively gauge the predictive power of the models, we first
compare the actual and the predicted distributions of the manufacturing
shares, and then check the statistical significance of the differences be-
tween them for the alternative equilibria of the models: λi (Model 1) and
λ1i and λ

2i (Model 2). A visual inspection of the distribution of the
manufacturing shares of the twomodels (Fig. 6 for Model 1, and Fig. 7 for
Model 2) corresponding to the most recent year show that the models are
capable of replicating the observed distributions fairly well, with the
exception of the largest EU country (Germany), for which the actual
share is 0.257 but the predicted share in Model 1 is only 0.190. A similar
pattern is observed in Model 2.
Turning to more formal statistical tests, besides Pearson's r and
Spearman's ρ coefficients of correlation, we also test the equality of the
distributions by way of a Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test. Table 11 summa-
rizes our results.
As can be seen from Table 11, both for linear (Pearson) and rank
(Spearman) correlations the coefficients are large and highly significant.
The Pearson standard correlation is 0.94 for λ1i in Model 2 and a
remarkable 0.980 for λ2i. The values for the Spearman correlations
confirm that the rank-orders observed in the data are mirrored by the
solution values. Additionally, the hypothesis of equality of distributions
cannot be generally rejected. Our results show that solving the models
using real data yields model equilibrium distributions of economic ac-
tivity that are in many cases statistically hard to distinguish from those
observed in the real economy. Of course, population and economic ac-
tivity are highly correlated in the data (0.96), so those results do not
come as a big surprise.
We hence next turn to wages.33 Here, the correlation is weaker—as
expected, given our theoretical results—yet still positive. The32 The ‘Ongoing Survey on Freight Road Transportation’ classifies shipments of
manufactured goods according to Council Regulation (EC) No 1172/98, and the
prevalent type of vehicle used to transport each type of good, along with the
information provided by the Observatory of Road Freight Transport Costs on
each type of vehicle (MFOM, 2007b).
33 Without loss of generality we choose the wage of the first country, Austria,
as the numeraire.
Table 11
Differences between observed and model distributions.
Test Pearson's1r Spearman's2ρ Kolmogorov-Smirnov3
Model Share 2001 2012 2001 2012 2001 2012
1 λ*i 0.9508 0.9585 0.7438 0.8562 0.1600 0.1600
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.877) (0.877)
2 λ1i 0.9249 0.9430 0.7608 0.8646 0.2400 0.2000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.414) (0.649)
λ2i 0.9802 0.9798 0.8754 0.8908 0.2400 0.1600
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.414) (0.877)
1 w*i 0.5541 0.2642 0.3231 0.3377 0.5200 0.4400
(0.004) (0.202) (0.115) (0.099) (0.001) (0.010)
2 w*i 0.2871 0.1884 0.2215 0.1738 0.5200 0.5200
(0.164) (0.367) (0.286) (0.404) (0.001) (0.001)
Notes: 1,2The null hypothesis is that both variables are independent; 3The null hypothesis is that both variables come from the same continuous distribution. p-values for
all tests in parenthesis.
J. Barbero et al. Regional Science and Urban Economics 71 (2018) 1–24correlations range from 0.26 to 0.55 for Model 1 in 2001, and are almost
equal to 0.33 in 2012, whereas they are fairly low (from 0.17 to 0.28
depending on the year) and not significant in Model 2. For both models, a
Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test fails to reject the null that the two distribu-
tions are different, althoughModel 1 globally performs better thanModel
2. In a nutshell, we do not find large and statistically strong correlations
between wages as proxied by GVA per employee (our empirical coun-
terpart for ‘wages’ at the aggregate level) and the equilibrium relative
wages implied by the two models. Hence, while the models perform well
in terms of their spatial predictions of economic activity, they perform
much worse in terms of their predictions for prices. There are at least four
possible reasons for this. First, as shown in the previous section, the
multi-country simulated models do not deliver clear results as to the roles
of market size and centrality on wages. It is thus not surprising that their
empirical fit to wage data in also fairly weak. Second, GVA per
employee—though widely used in the literature (see Head and Mayer,
2004)—is only a crude proxy for wages. Third, it is well known that
cross-country simulations suffer significantly from unobserved
country-level heterogeneity that is not embedded into the model. We
provide an application to regions within a country (Spain) in the sup-
plemental online appendix. Yet, even in that case, the model does not do
a fairly good job in predicting relative wages, especially their dispersion
(which is much higher in the data than in the model). Last, there are
many factors outside the models or not concurring with the theoretical
assumptions, such as the existence of unemployment and the absence of
labor market clearing—particularly in southern European countries.
These factors may also explain the divergences between the predictions
of the model and the observed data.
5. Conclusions
Combining both theoretical results and systematic numerical simu-
lations for two different trade models—one with a homogeneous and a
differentiated sector, and one with two differentiated sectors—we have19studied whether and how size and accessibility are linked to the equi-
librium industry shares and to wages when there is no factor price
equalization. Our key findings can be summarized as follows.
First, in accord with the theoretical results derived in lower-
dimensional instances of the models, the effect of local market size on
equilibrium wages crucially hinges on the countries' specialization pat-
terns. This finding generalizes to our numerical simulations.
Second, in all models that we simulate, the equilibrium relationship
between local market size and industry location is more robust than the
relationship between local market size and wages. Although the results
vary slightly depending on the type of trading network considered, they
are quite systematic. This suggests that equilibrium industry location is
fairly robust to the structure of the trade networks, but not wages and the
terms of trade. While two-country results can be partly extrapolated to
make statements about industry location in a multicountry world, this
definitively holds not true for two-country results on wages.
Third, the correlation between equilibrium wages and equilibrium
industry shares is rather low, thus suggesting that both variables operate
largely independently. Empirical tests and formal definitions of the home
market effect should therefore take into account both dimen-
sions—industry location and wages—in order to be relevant. To the best
of our knowledge, tests looking simultaneously at industry location and
factor prices have not yet been devised.
Last, when applied to European Union country-level data, we find
that in both cases the models generally predict well the distribution of
industries, yet predict less well wages. A formal test does not allow to
reject the null hypothesis that the industry distribution predicted by the
models is the same as that observed in the data. The test does, however,
reject the equality of observed and predicted wage distributions, because
the stylized models cannot replicate the observed dispersion in wages
across countries. This again shows that the models do a good job at
predicting industry location, but are less robust in terms of predicted
wages. Empirical work using wages to test for new economic geography
effects should thus be considered with some caution.Appendix
A.1. Factor price equalization
Assume that the homogeneous good can be costlessly traded across all countries. This is the case usually considered in the literature (e.g., Helpman
and Krugman, 1985). Marginal cost pricing then implies that the price of the homogeneous good is equal to the wage, which must be the same
everywhere. In other words, factor price equalization (FPE) holds.
In a multi-country world, the assumption of FPE has a major technical drawback. To see this, ask under what conditions FPE will hold? Clearly, FPE
will hold if and only if some homogeneous good is produced in every country. Following Behrens et al. (2007, 2009), a sufficient condition is that
θi > μ; 8i ¼ 1; 2;…;M: (A-1)
J. Barbero et al. Regional Science and Urban Economics 71 (2018) 1–24When (A-1) holds for all countries, and when trade in the homogeneous good is free, we have wi¼ 1 for all i¼ 1, 2,…,M. Observe that condition (A-1) is
extremely restrictive. Consider, e.g., a world with 30 countries. If market sizes θiwere identical across countries, we must have μ< 1/30. This is already
very restrictive. But in our case, since we randomly assign the shares θi to countries, we may have very small shares in some cases. In those cases, the
foregoing restriction can never be met for ‘reasonable values’ of μ.
Although condition (A-1) is technically speaking only a sufficient condition – i.e., we may still have FPE even when it is violated – it seems still very
unlikely to be met in general. Another potential problem in the FPE version of the model is that it displays a much larger share of ‘corner equilibria’, i.e.,
equilibria in which some countries are deindustrialized and do not host any of the differentiated sector. We have simulated the model with FPE and find
that the number of nodes with a zero industry share is 920 out of 2498, i.e. 36.82%. In a nutshell, the FPE model does not make much sense in a world
with many countries, neither theoretically nor empirically, and it is difficult to implement consistently for reasonable values of μ. We thus disregard it in
the remainder of this paper.
A.2. Complete specialization
In the case of complete specialization with three countries, we have by definition, X22¼ (1 μ)L2 and X33¼ (1 μ)L3. We further have
X21 þ X31 ¼ ð1 μÞw1L1
ξτ21
; (A-2)
with w2 1, i.e., the wage in country 2 is the numeraire, and w3¼ τ21/τ31 since both countries supply country 1 in the traditional good. Hence,
w2ξτ21¼w3ξτ31 must hold. The labor market clearing conditions in countries 2 and 3 are (1 μ)L2 þ τ21ξX21¼ L2 and (1 μ)L3 þ τ31ξX31¼ L3, which
directly yields
X21 ¼ μL2τ21ξ and X31 ¼
μL3
τ31ξ
:
Substituting into (A-2) allows us to solve for the wage in country 1 as follows:
w1 ¼ μ1 μ
ð1 θÞ
2θ

1þ τ21
τ31

(A-3)
One can verify that RMP1¼ 1 in that configuration, whereas
RMP2 ¼ wσ1
	
μϕ21 þ
1 μ
1þ τ21=τ31

1
ϕ12
þ τ21
τ31
ϕ32
ϕ31


is a complicated function of all trade barriers. An analogous expression holds for RMP3. Depending on the values of trade costs, RMP2< 1 and RMP3< 1
can hold, as required for equilibria with complete specialization. For example, if we set ϕ23	 0 and τ21¼ τ31, we need μ> θ so that w1> 1, and this can
be made compatible with RMP2< 1 and RMP3< 1. Generally, equilibria with complete specialization seem to be more likely to occur when the number
of regions increases. 34
A.3. Incomplete specialization
Incomplete specialization of type 1. The equilibriumwith incomplete specialization is determined as follows. We have X12¼ 0 and X22¼ (1 μ)L2
and
X11 > 0 and X21 ¼ ð1 μÞw1L1
ξτ
 X11: (A-5)
Equating labor supply and demand in country 2, including the traditional good lost in shipping, we thus have L2¼ X22 þ ξτX21¼ (1 μ)L2 þ (1  μ)
w1L1 ξτX11. Solving for L2, we have
L2 ¼ ξτμ ½ð1 μÞL1  X11 (A-6)
since w1¼ ξτ. Dividing by L and rewriting yields:34 For the case of two countries, where 1 is the core and 2 the periphery, we have.
RMP2 ¼ wσ1
	
μϕþ 1 μ
ϕ


; (A-4)
which needs to be smaller than 1 for an equilibrium with complete specialization to exist. Although given for the case of two countries, this could be given for any
symmetric star configuration (since the model can be reduced to the 2-country case under the assumption of symmetry; see footnote 12). Hence, this result holds for any
symmetric setting with more than two countries. Observe that for the 3-country case, the denominator in expression (A-4) would be 2ϕ. Hence, more countries make it
harder that the bracketed term is greater than one, thus making equilibria with complete specialization more likely.
20
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" #
ξτ
The latter expression is positive if and only if
ξτ >
μ
1 μ
1 θ
θ
: (A-8)
Since ξτ> 1, a sufficient condition for (A-8) to hold is that μ> θ. Since LH1 ¼ X11 ¼ L1  n1μL, using (A-7) then yields
ð1 μÞθ  ð1 θÞμ
ξτ
¼ θ  μn1 ⇒ n1 ¼ θ þ 1 θ
ξτ
;
which reveals that n1> θ and 0< ∂n1/∂θ< 1. It can further readily be verified that RMP1¼ 1 and that
RMP2 ¼ w
σ
1
n1

θϕþ 1 θ
ϕξτ

(A-9)
Expression (A-9) needs to be strictly smaller than 1 for an equilibrium with incomplete specialization to occur. To see when this can be the case, assume
that ξ< 1, i.e., trading the homogeneous good is less costly than trading the differentiated good (Davis, 1998). Assume also, for the sake of the
argument, that τ	 1, i.e., trade costs for manufactures are low. In that case, we have
RMP2 ¼ ξ
σ
θ þ ð1 θÞ=ξ

θ þ 1 θ
ξ

1 iff ξ < 1:
and this type of equilibrium can occur.
Incomplete specialization of type 2. Proceeding as in the case of type 1 incomplete specialization, and equating labor supply and demand in
country 2 we now have L2 ¼ X22þ ξτX21þ LD2 ¼ ð1 μÞL2þ ð1 μÞw1L1  ξτX11þ LD2 , with LD2 ¼ n2μL (recall that country 2 has also some of the
modern sector). Solving for eX11, we obtain
Xe11 ¼ ð1 μÞθ  ð1 θ  n2Þμ
ξτ
; (A-10)
since w1¼ ξτ. Since LH1 ¼ X11 ¼ L1 n1μL, using (A-10) then yields
ð1 μÞθ  ð1 θ  n2Þμ
ξτ
¼ θ  μn1 ⇒ n1 ¼ θ þ 1 θ  n2
ξτ
: (A-11)
For n2< 1 θ, we again have n1> θ and 0< ∂n1/∂θ< 1. To solve explicitly for n1 and n2, we can use either RMP1(n1, n2)¼ 1 or RMP2(n1, n2)¼ 1 and (A-
11).
A.4. Complete diversification
In the case of complete diversification, there are modern firms in each country. The two real market potentials are given by
RMP1 ¼
	
w1θ
w1σ1 θ þ ð1 θÞϕ
þ ð1 θÞϕ
w1σ1 θϕþ ð1 θÞ


wσ1
RMP2 ¼
	
w1θϕ
w1σ1 θ þ ð1 θÞϕ
þ 1 θ
w1σ1 θϕþ ð1 θÞ


Letting RMP1¼RMP2¼ 1 and totally differentiating, we can use the implicit function theorem to show that dw1/dθ> 0, i.e., local wages are increasing
in local market size. Indeed, we have
∂RMP1
∂θ
¼ w
1σ
1 ϕ
w1σ1 θ þ ϕð1 θÞ
2  ϕ2 w1σ1 ð2θ  1Þ
w1σ1 θϕþ ð1 θÞ
2 (A-12)
∂RMP1
∂w1
¼ ðσ  1Þθw
σ
1 ϕð1 θÞ
w1σ1 θ þ ϕð1 θÞ
2
 σð1 θÞ
2ϕwσ11 þ ð1 θÞθϕ2w2σ1
w1σ1 θϕþ ð1 θÞ
2 ;
(A-13)21
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dw1
dθ
jθ¼1=2 ¼ 
∂RMP1=∂θ
∂RMP1=∂w1
jθ¼1=2 > 0:
More generally, this relationship holds for all θ> 1/2 since ∂RMP1/∂θ> 0 at θ¼ 1/2 and at θ¼ 1 and since it is monotonic in θ.
B.1. Generating random tree networks
We use two different algorithms for generating random tree networks. The first one is based on Barabasi and Albert (1999). This algorithm starts
with a network havingM0 linked nodes. Then, it adds new nodes one by one, up toMT nodes in total, whereMT is the number of nodes of the network
(i.e., the number of countries in the model). Each time a new node is added to the network at iteration t, it is connected toMt1 pre-existing nodes. The
probability of being linked to an existing node during iteration t depends on the number of links– degree– of the node in the following way:
pit¼ deg(it1)/[
P
jdeg(jt1)], where pit is the probability of being linked to node i at iteration t, and where deg(it1) is the degree of node i at iteration
t 1. The Barabasi and Albert (1999) preferential attachment algorithm tends to create networks with some nodes that have a high degree, who are very
well connected, and other nodes with a very low degree, who are badly connected. Put differently, the resulting network tends to have hub-and-spoke
characteristics. By setting the initial number of nodes toM0¼ 2, and by setting the number of links for new nodes tom¼ 1, we ensure that the resulting
network is a connected tree with MT 1 links.
In the second algorithm we use, new nodes are added to preexisting nodes with equal attachment probability, which means that the probability of
being linked to node i at iteration t does not depend on the degree of node i. Formally, we have pit¼ 1/Mt1, whereMt1 is the number of nodes in the
network when adding the new node at iteration t.
Observe that the average degree of the tree network is equal to 2(MT 1)/MT, independently of the algorithm used to generate it. The reason is that
in an undirected graph, the degree sum formula is
P
jdegðjÞ ¼ 2jEj, where jEj is the number of links in the network. Since in the generated tree networks
there areMT 1 links, the degree sum formula becomes 2(MT 1). Then, the average degree of the network, defined as the degree sum over the number
of nodes in the network, is equal to 2(MT 1)/MT.
Observe further that the standard deviation of the degree of the nodes in the network will usually be higher in networks using the Barabasi and
Albert (1999) algorithm than in totally random tree networks. The reason is that this algorithm tends to generate a few nodes with a high degree, and a
lot of nodes with a very low degree.
Last, when generating random links in the networks we follow Behrens et al. (2007) and assume that the freeness of trade, ϕij, between adjacent
nodes i and j is given by 1/5. Hence, the freeness of trade between two nodes i and k, linked by a path P ¼ fi; j1; j2;…; jn1; kg of length n, is given by
ϕik ¼
Y
ðj;lÞ2P
ϕjl: (B-1)
We use only shortest paths in the network, which are computed using the Floyd-Warshall algorithm. Because we work with trees, the shortest path is
uniquely determined.
B.2. Details on the numerical implementation
We first use the algorithms described in Appendix B.1 to generate random networks. In all cases, we compute the equilibria of the twomodels for the
same set of networks. Hence, the results are directly comparable across models. For computational reasons, we generate random networks with between
20 and 30 nodes, the number of nodes being itself random (and drawn from a uniform distribution). Larger networks require too long to solve in the case
with a homogeneous good.
To solve the model, we transform the spatial equilibrium conditions (16) into complementary slackness conditions as follows:
½RMPiðnÞ  1ni ¼ 0; i ¼ 1; 2;…;M; (B-2)
where we make explicit the dependence of the real market potential on the whole distribution of firms n¼ (n1, n2,…, nM).
Model 1: One differentiated sector and one homogeneous sector.We add as nonlinear inequality constraints the equilibrium conditions (13) in
the homogeneous good market, the labor market clearing conditions (14), and the complementary slackness conditions (15) for exports of the ho-
mogeneous good:
ð1 μÞwiθi
minkfwkξτkig 
 eXii þX
j6¼i
eXji
!
¼ 0; 8i
θ  niμ
 
τiieXii þX
j6¼i
ξτijeXij
!
¼ 0; 8i
eXij	wiξτij min
k

wkξτkj

 ¼ 0; 8i
Furthermore, the following bounds for the variables are imposed: wi> 0 for all i and eXji  0 for all i and j. We also have the constraints that ni 0 for all i.
Note that the presence of the min function, which is not differentiable, makes it more difficult to solve the problem. To overcome this problem, we replace
all occurrences of the min function with a new variable, zi. To make sure that this new variable zi will be equal to the minimum, we substract it from the
objective function (i.e., it works as a penalty). Thus, the solver will maximize it. We add the constraint that it should not exceed the delivered price of the
homogeneous good: ziwjξτji, 8i, j. In doing so, we make sure that – in the final iteration – zi is equal to the minimum delivered price of the good.22
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The numerical implementation of the minimization problem – when substituting out the min operator – is as follows:
ðP 1Þ
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
min
n;w;
e
X
XM
i¼1
f½RMPiðnÞ  1ni g2 
XM
i¼1
zi
RMPiðnÞ  1; i ¼ 1; 2;…;M
ð1 μÞwiθi
zi

 eXii þX
j6¼i
eXji
!
¼ 0; 8i
θi  niμ
 
τiieXii þX
j 6¼i
ξτijeXij
!
¼ 0; 8i
zi  wjξτji; 8i; j
θi  niμ  0; 8ieXijwiξτij  zj ¼ 0; 8i
ni  0; 8i; wi > 0; 8ieXji  0; 8i; j
(B-3)
As starting values for the solver, we use the population share, θi, for the mass of firms, i.e., n0i ¼ θi. For the wages, we use w0i ¼ 1 for all i. Last, we start
with zeros for trade in the homogeneous good, eX0ki ¼ 0, and eX0ii ¼ ð1 μÞθi for the domestic supply of the homogeneous good to the local market.
Model 2: Two differentiated sectors. For the model with two differentiated sectors, we minimize the sum of the squared residuals of the two
complementary slackness conditions of the real market potential for each sector:
½RMPsiðns;wÞ  1 nsi ¼ 0; i ¼ 1; 2;…;M; s ¼ 1; 2:
The minimization problem is similar to the one in the case with a homogeneous good, but with two real market potential functions with the number of
firms, nsi, in each sector, the inclusion of the wages, and the constraint on the number of firms and the population shares:
ðP 2Þ
8>>>>><>>>>>:
min
n1 ;n2 ;w
XM
i¼1
f½RMP1iðn1;wÞ  1n1i g2
þ
XM
i¼1
f½RMP2iðn2;wÞ  1n2i g2
RMP1iðn1;wÞ  1; 8i
RMP2iðn2;wÞ  1; 8i
θi ¼ n1i þ n2i; 8i
n1i > 0; 8i; n2i > 0; 8i; wi > 0; 8i;
(B-4)
We solve the problems ðP 1Þ and ðP 2Þ for their equilibria fni ;wi g, and fn1i;n2i;wi g, respectively. We use the MATLAB function fmincon with the
interior-point algorithm. The code is available upon request.
C. Additional data tables
Table 12 below summarizes the data underlying the applications in Section 4. Additional references to data sources and the choice of parameter
values is also provided in that section.Table 12
Data for the 25 European Union countries.
Country Data 2001 Data 2012 μ123Labor % Closeness
CentralityG.V.A. Industry
%G.V.A. Services
%Labor % Closeness
CentralityG.V.A. Industry
%G.V.A. Services
%(AT) Austria 1.769 0.977 2.526 2.094 1.867 0.977 2.736 2.230 0.520
(BE) Belgium 1.979 0.933 2.634 2.726 2.078 0.928 2.697 3.004 0.530
(BG) Bulgaria 1.502 0.617 0.153 0.139 1.541 0.603 0.357 0.258 0.760
(CZ) Czech Republic 2.252 0.991 1.054 0.650 2.246 0.980 1.804 0.992 0.570
(DE) Germany 18.531 1.000 24.207 21.641 18.832 1.000 25.697 19.229 0.550
(DK) Denmark 1.286 0.792 1.719 1.791 1.216 0.782 1.683 1.842 0.570
(EE) Estonia 0.277 0.541 0.072 0.066 0.277 0.551 0.150 0.117 0.670
(EL) Greece 2.022 0.542 1.190 1.556 1.808 0.546 0.798 1.603 0.570
(ES) Spain 8.041 0.524 7.963 6.651 8.275 0.537 7.685 8.148 0.600
(FI) Finland 1.089 0.406 1.826 1.252 1.138 0.398 1.572 1.375 0.520
(FR) France 12.302 0.804 12.999 16.611 12.364 0.793 12.436 16.694 0.550
(HR) Croatia 0.657 0.774 0.255 0.223 0.706 0.774 0.34 0.290 0.700(continued on next page)
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CentralityG.V.A. Industry
%G.V.A. Services
%Labor % Closeness
CentralityG.V.A. Industry
%G.V.A. Services
%(HU) Hungary 1.807 0.900 0.664 0.519 1.716 0.901 0.850 0.612 0.610
(IE) Ireland 0.817 0.485 1.657 1.036 0.824 0.478 1.450 1.292 0.560
(IT) Italy 10.692 0.726 12.815 13.200 10.932 0.719 11.657 12.175 0.620
(LU) Luxembourg 0.089 0.959 0.159 0.275 0.103 0.949 0.161 0.388 0.550
(LV) Latvia 0.442 0.617 0.086 0.092 0.394 0.623 0.155 0.160 0.650
(NL) Netherlands 3.896 0.920 4.308 4.934 3.900 0.912 4.358 5.044 0.510
(PL) Poland 6.637 0.853 2.381 1.975 6.989 0.868 3.789 2.484 0.680
(PT) Portugal 2.403 0.450 1.338 1.316 2.066 0.474 1.084 1.271 0.530
(RO) Romania 5.091 0.659 0.596 0.326 3.952 0.661 1.481 0.764 0.790
(SE) Sweden 2.051 0.550 2.887 2.574 2.074 0.539 3.388 3.040 0.570
(SI) Slovenia 0.430 0.932 0.290 0.203 0.423 0.922 0.334 0.235 0.550
(SK) Slovakia 0.992 0.890 0.307 0.208 1.044 0.898 0.786 0.459 0.670
(UK) United
Kingdom12.945 0.671 15.914 17.939 13.236 0.662 12.551 16.298 0.510Mean 4.000 0.741 4.000 4.000 4.000 0.739 4.000 4.000 0.596
Std. Dev 4.846 0.191 6.111 6.266 4.941 0.188 5.928 5.763 0.078
Max 18.531 1.000 24.207 21.641 18.832 1.000 25.697 19.229 0.790
Min 0.089 0.406 0.072 0.066 0.103 0.398 0.150 0.117 0.510Notes: For Model 2, we have μ2¼ 1 μ1 by definition. See Section 4 for additional information on data sources and the choice of parameter values.
Appendix D. Supplementary data
Supplementary data related to this article can be found at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2018.04.005References
Baldwin, Richard, Forslid, Rikard, Martin, Philippe, Ottaviano, Gianmarco I.P., Robert-
Nicoud, Frederic, 2003. Economic Geography and Public Policy. Princeton University
Press, Princeton, NJ.
Barabasi, Albert-Laszlo, Albert, Reka, 1999. Emergence of scaling in random networks.
Science 286 (5439), 509–512.
Barbero, Javier, Zofío, Jose L., 2016. The multiregional core-periphery model: the role of
the spatial topology. Network. Spatial Econ. 16 (2), 469–496.
Behrens, Kristian, Ottaviano, Gianmarco I.P., 2011. General equilibrium trade theory and
firm behavior. In: Bernhofen, Daniel, Greenaway, David, Falvey, Rod,
Kreikemeier, Udo (Eds.), Palgrave Handbook of International Trade. Palgrave
MacMillan, Basingstoke, UK, pp. 119–159.
Behrens, Kristian, Lamorgese, Andrea R., Ottaviano, Gianmarco I.P., Tabuchi, Takatoshi,
2007. Changes in transport and non-transport costs: local vs global impacts in a
spatial network. Reg. Sci. Urban Econ. 37 (6), 625–648.
Behrens, Kristian, Lamorgese, Andrea R., Ottaviano, Gianmarco I.P., Tabuchi, Takatoshi,
2009. Beyond the Home Market Effect: market size and specialization in a multi-
country world. J. Int. Econ. 79 (2), 259–265.
Bosker, Maarten, Brakman, Steven, Garretsen, Harry, Schramm, Marc, 2010. Adding
geography to the new economic geography. J. Econ. Geogr. 10 (6), 793–823.
Broda, Christian, Weinstein, David E., 2006. Globalization and the gains from variety.
Q. J. Econ. 121 (2), 541–585.
Davis, Donald R., 1998. The home market, trade, and industrial structure. Am. Econ. Rev.
88 (5), 1264–1276.
Davis, Donald R., Weinstein, David E., 2003. Market access, economic geography and
comparative advantage: an empirical test. J. Int. Econ. 59 (1), 1–23.
Diewert, Walter E., 1971. An application of the Shephard duality theorem: a generalized
Leontief production function. J. Polit. Econ. 79 (3), 481–507.
Duranton, Gilles, Turner, Matthew A., 2012. Urban growth and transportation. Rev. Econ.
Stud. 79 (4), 1407–1440.
Freeman, Linton C., 1978. Centrality in social networks: conceptual clarification. Soc.
Network. 1 (3), 215–239.
Hanson, Gordon H., 2005. Market potential, increasing returns and geographic
concentration. J. Int. Econ. 67 (1), 1–24.
Hanson, Gordon H., Xiang, Chong, 2004. The Home-Market Effect and bilateral trade
patterns. Am. Econ. Rev. 94 (4), 1108–1129.
Head, Keith, Mayer, Thierry, 2004. The empirics of agglomeration and trade. In:
Henderson, J. Vernon, Thisse, Jacques-François (Eds.), Handbook of Regional and
Urban Economics, vol. 4. North Holland, Amsterdam, pp. 2609–2669.
Head, Keith, Mayer, Thierry, Ries, John, 2002. On the pervasiveness of home market
effects. Economica 69 (275), 371–390.
Helpman, Elhanan, Krugman, Paul R., 1985. Market Structure and Foreign Trade. MIT
Press, Cambridge, MA.Krugman, Paul R., 1980. Scale economies, product differentiation and the pattern of
trade. Am. Econ. Rev. 70 (5), 950–959.
MFOM, 2007a. Encuesta Permanente de Transporte de Mercancías por Carretera. A~no
2007. Ministerio de Fomento, Madrid.
MFOM, 2007b. Observatorio de Costes de Transporte de Mercancías por Carretera. A~no
2007. Ministerio de Fomento, Madrid.
Mion, Giordano, 2004. Spatial externalities and empirical analysis: the case of Italy.
J. Urban Econ. 56 (1), 97–118.
Ottaviano, Gianmarco I.P., Tabuchi, Takatoshi, Thisse, Jacques-François, 2002.
Agglomeration and trade revisited. Int. Econ. Rev. 43 (2), 409–436.
Ottaviano, Gianmarco I.P., Thisse, Jacques-François, 2004. Agglomeration and economic
geography. In: Henderson, J.V., Thisse, J.-F. (Eds.), Handbook of Regional and Urban
Economics, vol. 4. Elsevier, North-Holland, pp. 2563–2608.
Picard, Pierre M., Zeng, Dao-Zhi, 2005. Agricultural sector and industrial agglomeration.
J. Dev. Econ. 77 (1), 75–106.
Rauch, James E., 1999. Networks versus markets in international trade. J. Int. Econ. 48
(1), 7–35.
Spiekermann, Klaus, Wegener, Michael, 2008. Shrinking continent: accessibility,
competitiveness, and cohesion. In: Faludi, A. (Ed.), European Spatial Research and
Planning. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Cambridge, MA, pp. 115–140.
Stelder, Dirk, 2016. Regional accessibility in Europe: the impact of road infrastructure
1957-2012. Reg. Stud. 50 (6), 983–995.
Stelder, Dirk, Groote, Peter, de Bakker, Marien, 2013. Changes in Road Infrastructure and
Accessibility in Europe since 1960. Final Report, European Commission, Directorate-
General Regional Policy, Policy development Economic and quantitative analysis,
2012. CE.16.BAT.040.
Takahashi, Toshiaki, Takatsuka, Hajime, Zeng, Dao-Zhi, 2013. Spatial inequality,
globalization, and footloose capital. Econ. Theor. 53 (1), 213–238.
Takatsuka, Hajime, Zeng, Dao-Zhi, 2012a. Trade liberalization and welfare:
differentiated-good versus homogeneous-good markets. J. Jpn. Int. Econ. 26 (3),
308–325.
Takatsuka, Hajime, Zeng, Dao-Zhi, 2012b. Mobile capital and the home market effect.
Can. J. Econ. 45 (3), 1062–1082.
Thompson, Gary D., 1988. Choice of flexible functional forms: review and appraisal.
J. Agric. Resource Econ. 13 (2), 169–183.
Xie, Feng, Levinson, David, 2008. Topological evolution of surface transportation
networks. Comput. Environ. Urban Syst. 33 (3), 211–223.
Yu, Zhihao, 2005. Trade, market size, and industrial structure: revisiting the home-market
effect. Can. J. Econ. 38 (1), 255–272.
Zeng, Dao-Zhi, Kikuchi, Toru, 2009. Home market effect and trade costs. Jpn. Econ. Rev.
60 (2), 253–270.
Zeng, Dao-Zhi, Uchikawa, Tomohiro, 2014. Ubiquitous inequality: the home market
effect in a multicountry space. J. Math. Econ. 50, 225–233.
